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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GROUP RIGHTS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S APPROACH
TO MINORITY LANGUAGES
ROBERT F. WEBER*
INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU)1 is a supranational entity comprised
of twenty-five member states, and vests rights with the individual
citizens of those Member States. However, Europe as a cultural
space consists of many more constitutive groups that are currently left
out of the structural legal framework of European integration.
Minority language groups, in particular, have been the subject of
efforts by Member States to protect and preserve linguistic diversity
within their borders. The extent and variety of solutions employed by
Member States to protect their resident autochthonous languages
testifies to the importance of accommodating minority languages into
the European legal landscape.
The thesis of this Article is that the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) jurisprudence puts the legality of these measures in jeopardy,

Copyright © 2007 by Robert F. Weber.
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United States Court of
International Trade. J.D., University of Michigan, 2005; A.B., Duke University, 2001.
1. The European Union is comprised of three “pillars”: the European Community (EC or
Community), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters pillar. This article is concerned exclusively with the EC, which is
itself comprised of various institutions, including, most importantly, the European Parliament,
the European Council, the European Court of Justice, and the European Commission. The
various treaties discussed herein have created and defined all three pillars, but the institutions
that are charged with defining, enforcing, and explicating the important non–discrimination
norms are all part of the EC, and have little relevance in the context of the other pillars.
References therefore will be made to “EC law” and “the EC” to describe the relevant
institutions and laws. There is one important exception to this rule of thumb: the crucial
concept of “citizenship” is referred to as “EU citizenship,” following the example of Article 17
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which refers to “Citizenship of the
Union.” Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 17, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
as amended by Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, as amended by Treaty of
Nice, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1, consolidated version reprinted in 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
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and that to ensure the continued vitality of minority languages within
the Member States, it may be necessary to formulate new protective
strategies to replace some of the old methods whose compatibility
with the EC Treaty is, by now, dubious. This Article will be divided
into three parts that aim:
(1)
to provide a brief overview of the legal structures Member
States have erected to protect the linguistic and cultural
diversity within their borders, as well as the efforts made
by the various EU institutions to do the same;
(2)
to elaborate a theoretical and practical distinction
between group rights and individual rights; and
characterize the process of European economic, social,
and political integration, in contrast to the approach taken
by the Member States, as fundamentally centered on
individual, and not group, rights—an approach which is
inadequate to protect minority languages; and
(3)
to examine the salient ECJ cases in this field in the light of
the group rights/individual rights distinction, and analyze
their effect on efforts to protect and preserve minority
languages and cultures.
In conclusion, this Article recommends an interpretive strategy that
would permit the ECJ to consider group rights for minority languages
as a sui generis subject of Community law and thereby minimize the
risk that bona fide group-protective measures will run afoul of the
non-discrimination principle contained in EC Treaty Article 12. That
failing, the Article argues further that minority groups and Member
States should refocus their political efforts to address minority
language concerns in the EC Treaty itself, since the expanded notion
of EU citizenship and the ECJ’s willingness to invoke the EC Treaty’s
non-discrimination principle in new contexts have placed many
Member State efforts to create minority language group rights in
potential conflict with the EC Treaty.
I. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF
LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY IN THE MEMBER STATES AND IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
It is estimated that one out of every eight citizens of the
2
European Union speaks a minority language. Given that the 1997
2. Francesco Palermo, The Use of Minority Languages: Recent Developments in EC Law
and Judgments of the ECJ, 8 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 299, 299 (2001).
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Treaty of Amsterdam included the first and only treaty reference
3
solely directed to minority populations, it is hardly surprising that the
Member States have addressed the issue of minorities independently
of the EC. The Member States’ attempts at accommodating
minorities have taken on different forms, and have achieved varying
success. Because the legal treatment of minorities (and minority
languages in particular) has been guided primarily by the Member
States, any study of minority rights must begin there, before
proceeding to the EC’s—and the ECJ’s— treatment of the issue. In
other words, to know how European integration affects minority
rights, it is essential to analyze the current domestic protections for
these groups, and how these legal protections may conflict with the
EC Treaty.
Five modes of addressing minorities in Member State law are
most prevalent4: first, formal constitutional recognition of multiple
official languages; second, constitutional incorporation of protection
for linguistic minorities; third, establishing autonomous zones or
communities with special language rights; fourth, central legislative
accommodation and recognition; and fifth, permitting small scale,
informal local measures designed to accommodate minority
languages. Most Member States employ hybrid forms of protection
for their minority cultures and languages, making use of multiple
protective strategies. What follows is a representative sample of
strategies utilized by various Member States to incorporate linguistic
minority protection.
A. Formal Constitutional Recognition of Multiple Official
Languages
When a minority language achieves official status, it obtains a
unique legal status within the state.5 Often, citizens may invoke a

3. Id. at 300.
4. The division into five categories is rough and by no means complete. Nearly all
Member States make use of several protective legal measures. The division into five categories
serves only to highlight some of the more prominent legal structures.
5. An example from the United States is the Hawaiian Constitution, which provides that
“English and Hawaiian shall be the official languages of Hawaii.” HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4.
However, Hawaiian “shall be required for public acts and transactions only as provided by law.”
Id. The state legislature has ruled out mandatory use of Hawaiian, enacting a statute that
succinctly states, “Hawaiian shall not be required for public acts and transactions.” HAW. REV.
STAT. § 1-13 (2006). In addition, the legislature has enacted a sort of supremacy provision that
gives binding effect to the English version of a law “[w]henever there is found to exist any
radical and irreconcilable difference.” Id. The jurisprudence addressing Article XV, § 4 has
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right to utilize the minority language in any official capacity. Official
documents must often be provided in the official minority language as
well. The most obvious case of formal constitutional recognition is
Ireland. Ireland’s Constitution declares that the Irish language
(Gaeilge, in Irish) is the “first official language” of Ireland, though it
technically a minority language, and less frequently used than
English—the “second” official language.6
Finland is another
example, where the Swedish-speaking minority is protected by the
7
official status of Swedish in Finland.
Through a unique constitutional apparatus, the Belgian
Constitution impliedly recognizes three official languages. Belgium
can be divided into three ethno-linguistic groupings, with a Flemishspeaking majority (about fifty-five percent), a sizable francophone
minority (about forty percent) and a small but significant regionally
8
concentrated German-speaking population (about five percent).
Article 2 of the Belgian Constitution divides Belgium into three
“Communities”: a German-speaking Community, a Flemish-speaking
Community, and a French-speaking Community.9 In addition, Article
3 provides that Belgium is comprised of three regions: the Walloon
10
Roughly
region, the Flemish region, and the Brussels region.
speaking, the francophone Community resides in Walloon, along with
11
the German-speaking minority. Brussels is split between Flemish

interpreted the provision restrictively, and courts, as a general matter, do not seem to be too apt
to read implied rights to invoke Hawaiian language rights where such rights are not necessary.
See, e.g., Tagupa v. Odo, 843 F.Supp 630, 631 (D. Haw. 1994) (upholding a magistrate judge’s
grant of a protective order denying a deponent the “right” to conduct a deposition in Hawaiian
despite deponent’s fluency in English).
6. IR. CONST. art. 8, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/
Constitution%20of%20IrelandNov2004.pdf. Interestingly, Ireland was the only signatory to the
treaties that did not require that its national and official language should be a working language
of the European Community. See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Impact of European Law on
Linguistic Diversity, 5 IRISH J. EURO. L. 63, 69 (1996); but see infra note 91.
7. The Finnish Constitution establishes both Finnish and Swedish as national languages.
See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] art. 17 (Finland), available at http://www.om.fi/
uploads/54begu60narbnv_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
8. See Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E
Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 551-52 (1991).
9. See BELG. CONST. art. 2.
10. The Belgian Constitution also creates four “linguistic regions” including the three
spoken languages and the bilingual Brussels area. See BELG. CONST. art. 4. This division is
more symbolic than of juridical consequence, where the regional and community groupings
emerge as more relevant.
11. 4 NEW ENCYC. BRITANNICA 828 (15th ed. 1986).
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and French speakers.12 The Walloon region and the Flemish region
are located, respectively, in southern and northern Belgium. Each
13
Community elects a Community Council to act on its behalf. The
constitution lays out a complicated scheme of government that grants
to the linguistic communities varying degrees of autonomy over core
cultural competences including education, cultural policy, and interCommunity cooperation. A sort of minority veto exists as well. The
Communities are grouped in the federal parliament such that if threequarters of a linguistic group believe a proposed law threatens to
“gravely damage” inter-Community relations, the dissenting group
may halt the legislative process and initiate a set of special review
procedures.14
The regional governments are elected by the
Community Councils15 and their powers are derived from devolutions
16
from the federal government.
Notably, and unlike the Finnish and Irish examples, Belgium’s
17
federal constitution does not recognize any official languages per se,
but instead attempts to map its constitutional system onto an alreadyexisting linguistic situation.
The regions and Communities
themselves must determine, by way of procedures outlined in the
federal constitution, the trajectory of their own linguistic policy.18 To
use the popular legal binary, Belgium is concerned primarily with
granting procedural rights to linguistic groups, and eschews
substantive rights at the federal level. Though German is an
“implied” official language, rights to use German are limited in scope
geographically; it is officially recognized in only the nine
municipalities that make up the German-speaking Community.19 In

12. 4 NEW ENCYC. BRITANNICA 584 (15th ed. 1986).
13. See BELG. CONST. arts. 115-21.
14. See id. art. 54; see also Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 8 at 551-52.
15. See BELG. CONST. art. 122.
16. See id. art. 39.
17. The regions, by contrast, do have official languages. The official language of the
Flemish Region is Dutch. The official languages of the Walloon Region are Dutch and French.
The Brussels Region is also officially bilingual. See Venice Comm’n, Venice, Italy, Mar. 8-9,
2002, On Possible Groups of Persons to which the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities Could Be Applied in Belgium, CDL-AD 1, para. 22 (2002) (Mar. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL(2002)021-e.asp.
18. BELG. CONST. arts. 129-30.
19. See Wouter Pas, A Dynamic Federalism Built on Static Principles: The Case of Belgium,
in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 157, 158-59 (G. Alan
Tarr, et al. eds., 2004) (“In 1970, the Belgian State was divided into four territorial linguistic
regions: The Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the bilingual region of
Brussels-Capital, and the German-speaking region . . . . The authorities in each region may, in
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addition, the federal government has granted German speakers
limited rights to use German in administrative capacities in a small
20
group of municipalities in the French-speaking Walloon region.
Thus, though the constitution recognizes the German-speaking
minority and incorporates it into the constitutional order, on the
ground German speakers can rely on limited regional rights. The
constitution thus divides Belgium’s geographic space according to the
languages spoken in those regions. The Belgian Constitution
presupposes an interaction between minority language groups and the
majority Flemish Community on the federal and regional levels.
B. Constitutional Mandate to Protect Minorities
A state’s constitution may mandate that the state take certain
action to protect the linguistic diversity contained within its borders.
In such an arrangement, the linguistic policy is distributed, pursuant
to the constitutional mandate, top-down from the central government
instead of horizontally from a sub-state entity. Italy is the Member
21
State wherein the largest number of minority populations reside.
Article 6 charges the Italian Republic with “protect[ing] [its] linguistic
22
minorities with appropriate [norms].” Nevertheless, and in part due
to the protections already in place from the regions system,23 the
Italian Parliament passed general protective legislation pursuant to its
Article 6 powers in 1999—fifty-one years after the Constitution
entered into force.
The 1999 law protects the language and culture of the Albanian,
Catalán, German, Greek, Slovene, and Croat populations, as well as
those speaking French Provençal, Friulan, Ladin, Occitan, and
24
Sardinian. Of particular note is the categorization of minority group
principle, only use the official language of that region in their dealings with citizens.”); Venice
Comm’n, supra note 17, para. 21.
20. Venice Comm’n, supra note 17, para. 27.
21. An estimated 2.5 million people belong to at least twelve minority groups within Italy.
Francesco Palermo, The Never-Ending Story? The Italian Draft Bill on Linguistic Minorities, in
MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 55, 55 (Snezana Trifunovska ed., 2001).
22. COST. art. 6 (Italy) (translation is the author’s). The centrality of this article is
emphasized by its location after articles 4 and 5 (guaranteeing the right to work and respecting
the autonomy of localities) and before articles 7 and 8 (dividing the Italian republic from the
Vatican and establishing freedom of religion).
23. See discussion infra part I.C. Indeed, the 1999 law does not apply to the five regions
that have passed more protective legislation regarding minority languages. Palermo, supra note
21, at 61.
24. Law n.482, 297 Gazz. Uff., Dec. 20, 1999, art. 2 [hereinafter 1999 Law], available at
http://www.parlamento.it/leggi/99482l.htm.
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rights. Parliament singled out groups25 in need (or deserving, in the
26
eyes of some of the right-leaning political parties ) of protection,
rather than establishing minimum guarantees generally applicable to
all individual citizens. Of course, such treatment may be inevitable
for effective protection mandated by Article 6, but it also underscores
the gravamen of that constitutional mandate: to protect linguistic and
cultural minorities means to protect designated groups of citizens.
The effect of the 1999 law is to establish a minimum level of
protection in accordance with Article 6, but only for the enumerated
minorities. A few of the salient provisions of the law include:
permission for kindergarten instruction in minority languages,27 and
teaching minority culture and traditions in elementary and secondary
28
schools; permission to use minority languages in dealings with
government offices and entities including before justices of the peace
(low-level judges);29 and authority for the regions to enter into
agreements regarding transmission of programming relevant to
minorities, as well as permission for regions to grant financial aid to
the media to implement use of minority languages.30
C. Decentralized Autonomous Zones Regulating Their Own
Language Policy
Decentralization involves a central state ceding some of its
authority in the cultural-linguistic realm to sub-state political entities
and institutions, usually on a territorial basis. Decentralization is
short of a full-blown federal system, where a sub-state entity may be
granted limited sovereignty. However, by decentralizing or devolving
control over the linguistic sphere of government activity,
decentralization improves efficiency, as well as enhancing democracy

25. And did so crudely, perhaps, at least to a reader versed in American Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. Antoni Milian i Massana makes the same point, in a slightly
different context, referring to the Province of Bolzano’s separation of German- and Italianspeaking students. To Massana, the “separate but equal” idea fails when the criteria for
separation of students bears no relation to the education of the students—a circumstance that
distinguishes racist segregation from functional linguistic separation. ANTONI MILIAN I
MASSANA, DERECHOS LINGUÏSTICOS Y DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL A LA EDUCACIÓN: UN
ESTUDIO COMPARADO: ITALIA, BELGICA, SUIZA, CANADA, Y ESPAÑA 134-37 (1994).
26. Palermo, supra note 21, at 63.
27. 1999 Law, arts. 4-6.
28. Id. art. 4(2).
29. Id. arts. 7, 9.
30. Id. arts. 12, 14.
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and legitimacy.31 Ultimately, because sovereignty is not shared, the
32
sub-state authorities are responsible to the central state.
Italy provides an instructive example of decentralization. In
addition to its constitutionally-mandated protective competence, the
Italian Constitution sets up a system of regions, and grants limited
autonomous status to the five regions where linguistic minorities are
most entrenched: Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Val d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto
Adige, Sardegna, and Sicilia. The rights that attach to minority
speakers originate in legislation passed by the regional governments,
and such rights are connected to the territory, not the residents, of the
33
regions.
Spain’s 1978 Constitution adopts a similar decentralized
34
constitutional system with respect to its autochthonous languages.
Despite establishing Castilian as the official language of Spain, the
preamble to the Constitution “proclaims its intention [p]rotect all
Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of
their cultures and traditions, and of their languages and institutions.”35
The inclusion of “languages” in a preamble’s laundry list falls short of
the unambiguous protective mandate contained in Article 6 of the
Italian Constitution, but nevertheless indicates the central role Spain
plays in protecting Spanish language and culture. Article 2, in turn,
guarantees a “right to autonomy” for the “nationalities and regions of
which [Spain] is composed.”36
As far as decentralized linguistic policy is concerned, the more
interesting passage is Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution, which
explains how the “right to autonomy” is exercised in the linguistic
realm. Article 3, after establishing Castilian as the official language

31. See Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global
Age, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1251, 1260 (2004).
32. See id. at 1261.
33. For example, a French-speaking inhabitant of the Val d’Aosta can only make use of her
language rights within the Val d’Aosta, and may not rely on those protection outside the region.
This anomaly results in part from the Italian Parliament’s decision not to expand regional
language rights to a nationwide application. See Palermo, supra note 21, at 55-56; see also Case
C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637.
34. See generally, C.E. arts. 143-58 (Spain). For a more complete discussion of the Spanish
Constitution and linguistic rights, see Giovanni Poggeschi’s appropriately titled article The
Linguistic Struggle in the Almost Federal Spanish System, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLITICAL REGULATION OF ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CONFLICTS 313, 315 (Mitja Žagar, Boris
Jesih & Romana Bešter eds., 1999).
35. C.E. pmbl. (emphasis added) (translation is the author’s), available at
http://www.boe.es/datos_iberlex/normativa/TL/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf.
36. Id. art. 2.
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of Spain, declares that the “remaining Spanish languages also have
official status in the autonomous communities, in accordance with
37
Among the seventeen autonomous
their respective Statutes.”
communities, provided for in the Constitution itself, are various
groups that have historically had languages of their own (as well as
nationalist aspirations), such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and
Galicia.38 The basic law for the autonomous communities is found in
their respective Statutes of Autonomy. Pursuant to Article 3 of the
Constitution, the Aragon’s Statute of Autonomy promises a
forthcoming law (yet to arrive) protecting Aragonese,39 and Catalán
40
the Balearic
enjoys equal status with Castilian in Catalonia,
41
42
Islands, and Valencia. Galician is an official language in Galicia,43
and the Basque language has official status (along with Castilian, of
44
course) in the Autonomous Basque Community, as well as limited
45
recognition in the community of Navarra.
The autonomous communities effect linguistic politics and
legislation on a regional level, providing local protection for the local
languages. The example of Catalonia is instructive as to how the
system functions. Prior to August 2006, the linguistic policy of
Catalonia was determined by the Ley de política lingüística which the
46
Catalán Parliament (or Generalitat) enacted in 1997 under the

37. Id. art. 3. The Spanish Constitution does not use the term “minority” as the Italian
Constitution does. Giovanni Poggeschi hypothesizes that this absence may be due to the
greater proportion of Spaniards who communicate in an alternate language. See Giovanni
Poggeschi, Linguistic Rights in Spain, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 85, supra note 21.
38. See Guibernau, supra note 31, at 1262; see also Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Catalonia
and the Basque Country, in DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 55 (Michael O’Neill &
Dennis Austin eds., 2000).
39. Statute of Autonomy for Aragon, art. 7, available at http://www.aragob.es/pre/
cido/estatut1.htm (last visited June 18, 2007).
40. The Catalonian Statute of Autonomy goes one step further than the analogous
provisions in other Statutes of Autonomy, and actually declares Catalán to be the “preferred”
language for official use. Statute of Autonomy for Catalunya, art. 6.1 (2006).
41. Statute of Autonomy for the Balearic Islands, art. 3.1.
42. Statute of Autonomy for the Valencian Community, art. 7.
43. Recent events exposed a less salubrious effect of minority language policy in Galicia.
Due to a new law requiring Galician language ability for all public service employees, there was
a critical shortage of firefighters to battle the fires afflicting Galicia during the summer of 2006.
See Observer, Ridiculous in Any Language, FIN. TIMES: FT.COM, Aug. 10, 2006, www.ft.com
(search for “Galicia” and “experienced firefighters).
44. Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country, art. 6.
45. Statute of Autonomy for Navarra, art 9.2.
46. Each autonomous community has a single chamber legislative assembly. Following
regional elections, the leader of the majority party usually assumes the presidency of the
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jurisdiction of the autonomous community and in accordance with
Article 148(17) of the Spanish Constitution concerning the rights of
the communities to teach in the local language and encourage
minority culture and research.47 The law reaffirmed the official status
of Catalán, and included a right to be answered in Catalán by a
48
person in the public administration. The law also included a number
of provisions encouraging the use of Catalán in universities.49 The
most striking aim of that law concerned the use of Catalán by the
media and in the sphere of economic activity. All radio and TV
channels operating within Catalonia must broadcast at least 50% of
the time in Catalán, and radio music must include twenty-five percent
Catalán or Aranese songs.50 The law contained further ambitious
intrusions aimed at stimulating many fields of culture industry.51
However, in August 2006, Catalonian linguistic policy underwent
an epochal transformation with the entry into force of a new Statute
of Autonomy, approved by the Catalonian voters on July 18, 2006.
The new Statute goes much further than the Ley de política
lingüística. Now, Catalán is “the language of normal and preferential
use in Public Administration bodies and in the public media of
Catalonia.”52 Perhaps even more significantly, the Statute makes
Catalán “the language of normal use for teaching and learning in the
53
The Statute also grants official status to
educational system.”
Occitan, one dialect of which, Aranese, is spoken in the province of
Aran in Catalonia.54 Article 33.1 of the Statute grants to citizens “the
55
right to linguistic choice.” However, later the Article refers to “each
individual[‘s] . . . right to use the official language of his or her
choice.”56 It is unclear whether this distinction between citizen and

community. For a discussion of the political institutions of the autonomous communities, see
Guibernau, supra note 31, at 1262-63.
47. Ley de política lingüística, 1/1998, Jan. 7, 1998.
48. See id. arts. 2-3.
49. See, e.g., id. art. 22.
50. See id. art. 26.
51. See generally Poggeschi, The Linguistic Struggle, supra note 34; Poggeschi, Linguistic
Rights in Spain, supra note 37.
52. Statute of Autonomy of Catalunya, art. 6.1.
53. Id. art. 35.1 (“Catalán shall be used as the teaching and learning language for university
and non-university education.”).
54. Id. art. 6.5. Practically speaking, only “citizens of Aran” possess the right to deal with
the Generalitat in Occitan. Id. art. 36.2.
55. Id. art. 33.1.
56. Id.
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individual57 will affect the treatment of Catalán speakers in practice,
or whether all persons will be able to avail themselves of the right to
use Catalán.
The right to linguistic choice applies to all
administrative, notarial, registration, or judicial procedures.58
Communications by Catalonian public officials will be executed in
59
Catalán, without prejudice to the rights of Castilian speakers. There
is even a “right to be attended” to in Catalán that can be invoked
against private establishments, provided they are “open to the
public.”60
D. Affirmative Protection and Recognition from Central
Government
Lacking the decentralized regional, or community, structure of
Spain and Italy, other Member States administer similar policies from
the central government authorities. In the Netherlands, for instance,
the Frisian language is spoken in Friesland, a province with a
population of 610,000.61 Almost fifty-five percent of the provincial
population considers Frisian to be their mother tongue, and about
seventy-five percent know how to speak it.62 The Dutch government
has stated formally that, along with Dutch, Frisian is an indigenous
63
language of the Netherlands. Parliament has gone beyond mere
recognition, by enacting measures aimed at accommodating Frisian
speakers in Friesland, including inter alia: detailed rules on the use of
Frisian in an administrative or judicial capacity; rules establishing the
legal basis for changing toponymical names from Dutch into Frisian;
and provisions to encourage the use of Frisian in schools.64
Though the Frisian language is not threatened, and seems to be
enjoying a wide range of accommodating measures from the central
Dutch government, it must be remembered that the Dutch

57. In U.S. law, the distinction between citizen and person has a particular importance in
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See generally Richard A.
Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 334 (2005).
58. Statute of Autonomy of Catalunya, arts. 33.1-2.
59. Id. art. 50.5.
60. Id. art. 34.
61. Floris Van Laanen, The Frisian Language in the Netherlands, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN
EUROPE, supra note 21, at 67, 69.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 70, 76-79.

03__WEBER.DOC

372

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

10/4/2007 9:52:56 AM

[Vol 17:361

Constitution is silent with respect to minority languages,65 and that the
Friesland province has no decentralized grant of authority, from the
constitution or otherwise, to take affirmative protective measures. In
the Netherlands, the central government guarantees minority
66
Similar
language rights primarily pursuant to treaty obligations.
concessions are made for the Mirandés community in northern
Portugal.67
Another fascinating permutation of this strategy resulted in the
“Good Friday Agreement” entered into between Ireland and the
United Kingdom in 1998. That treaty, among other more urgent
objectives, granted limited formal recognition to Irish and various
dialects of Scots in Northern Ireland.68
In recent years, the United Kingdom has made similar
allowances for the 659,000 Welsh speakers in Wales69 and the sixty
70
thousand Scottish Gaelic speakers in Scotland. Prior to 1993, the
United Kingdom merely provided a limited discretion for local judges
and administrative officials to permit the use of Welsh. With the
passage of the Welsh Language Act of 1993, Parliament placed the
Welsh language on official status with English in dealings with the
public sector.71 The Welsh Language Act breaks with a predominant
policy of Anglicization and represents a significant change in the
United Kingdom’s posture regarding the Welsh minority living in the
United Kingdom.72 Parliament made a similar, though less expansive,

65. Indeed, the Netherlands is one of two members of the EC having a written constitution
that has no mention of official languages. The other is Denmark. Id. at 72.
66. In other words, the requirement in Dutch law to respect linguistic minorities comes
from Dutch accession to international agreements rather than an internal constitutional
mandate. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966,
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
67. See Lei n.7/99, Reconhecimento oficial de direitos linguísticos da comunidade
mirandesa (official recognition of the language rights of the Mirandes Community); see also
Despacho Normativo n. 35/99 (implementing regulations to provide Mirandés education,
including a limited grant of power to local institutions (entidades da comunidade) to participate
in the coordination of cultural and educational projects).
68. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, U.K.-Ir., Apr. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
751, 769-70 (1998) [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement].
69. Omniglot Writing Systems & Languages of the World: Welsh (Cymraeg),
http://www.omniglot.com/writing/welsh (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
70. Omniglot Writing Systems & Languages of the World: Scottish Gaelic (Gàidhlig),
http://www.omniglot.com/writing/gaelic (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
71. See Welsh Language Act, 1993, c. 38 (U.K.).
72. Cf. Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English, Nationalism, and Linguistic Terror: A French
Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. 285, 337 nn. 215-16 (1996) (discussing examples of the United
Kingdom’s monolingual tendencies).
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overture to the Scottish Gaelic speakers by promulgating the Gaelic
73
Language (Scotland) Act 2005. That act granted a limited official
status to Scottish Gaelic in Scotland.
E. Nonmandatory and Discretionary Accommodation
A fifth mode of Member States’ linguistic accommodation—
nonmandatory accommodation—is prevalent, most notably, in
France. France, more than any other Member State, has adopted the
“ostrich approach” to its minority languages—sticking its head in the
sand rather than acknowledging its linguistic minorities in any
meaningful way.74 Article 2 of the French Constitution is notably the
only article of that document addressing language: “French is the
language of the Republic.”75 Postcolonial France has been the
76
prototype of an assimilation-oriented society, and has yet to extend
formal recognition to its autochthonous minority languages, despite
the fact that an estimated 9 million French citizens speak a minority
language.77 Indeed, the French accession to the European Charter of
Regional and Minority Languages was stonewalled by the high
French Constitutional Council because certain provisions in the
Charter purported to create group rights (in violation of the unity of
the French Republic) and to grant quasi-official status to minority
languages (in violation of Article 2 of the Constitution).78 The French

73. Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act, 2005, c. 7 (U.K.).
74. See Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of Language in
Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719, 730-31 (2001).
75. LA CONSTITUTION art. 2 (Fr.) (translation is the author’s).
76. See Palermo, supra note 2, at 302 (discussing the unitary conception of French
citoyenneté). Cf. Law No. 75-1349 of Dec. 31, 1975, Journal Officiel de la République Franiçaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 1976, p. 189 (known as “la loi Bas-Lauriol”). That
law rendered obligatory the use of the French language for various commercial activities, so
much so that recourse to foreign words is prohibited except where there is no similar French
expression. In the field of language policy, Suzanne Citron relates much of French
intransigency and repression of its minority languages back to the leaders of the Third Republic
(1870-1940) who, as “heirs of the revolutionaries, were, like [their ancestor revolutionaries],
impervious to the idea that cultures other than their own [French] culture could exist in
France.” SUZANNE CITRON, L’HISTOIRE DE FRANCE: AUTREMENT 174 (1992) (translation is
the author’s).
77. See Les 75 langues minoritaires de France, L’HUMANITE (Fr.), June 25, 1999, available
at http://www.humanite.fr/journal/1999-06-25/1999-06-25-29195.
78. See CC decision no. 99-412DC, June 15, 1999, Rec. 71 (Fr.). One commentator has
suggested that the Conseil constitutionnel’s sweeping conclusions all but extinguished the hope
for focused constitutional amendments designed to clear the way for passage of the Charter.
See Karin Oellers–Frahm, International Decision: Charte Éuropéenne des Langues Régionales
ou Minoritaires, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 913, 938-41 (1999).
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government has passed a handful of administrative decrees and laws
regarding the school instruction of minority languages, as well as their
79
Such measures are predictably
presence in the mass media.
toothless, and are nearly always phrased so as to give ultimate
discretion to the teachers, school administration, or those exerting
control over the public media.80
F. European Community Efforts to Protect Minority Languages
While Member States have developed an elaborate architecture
of minority language rights, the European Community has not
pursued the point with comparable zeal—at least not at the legal
level.81 Indeed, the EC does not formally recognize linguistic
minorities.82 This is not to say the EC has not visited the issue of
regional and minority languages; to the contrary, the EC institutions
have made numerous soft law pronouncements and funded projects
to protect minority languages. The EC should be commended for its
growing concern about minority rights, but this Article argues that
such efforts are limited by the structural incompatibility of European
integration with the legal protection of regional and minority
linguistic groups. Nevertheless, the EC seems determined to protect,

79. See, e.g., Law No. 51-46 of Jan. 11, 1951, Journal Officiel de la République Française
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 13, 1951, p. 483 (known as “la Loi Deixonne”)
(permitting school instructors to draw on local languages when doing so would benefit
instructors’ lesson plans, particularly when teaching the French language). See also Law No. 8452 of Jan. 26, 1984 Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], Jan. 27, 1984, p. 431, 432 (known as “la Loi Savary”) (requiring the government to “see
to the promotion and enrichment of the French language, as well as the regional languages and
cultures.”). Such treatment was extended to all levels of education in 1989. Law No. 89-486 of
July 10, 1989, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
July 14, 1989, p. 8860 (explaining that instruction in local langages forms an important basis of
general education at all levels). For media, a decree was issued in 1987 urging the national radio
authorities to contribute “to the expression and information of cultural, social, and professional
communities.” See Décret of Nov. 13, 1987, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 15, 1987, p. 13326, arts. 3,6.
80. See id.
81. See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European
Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 331, 358-59 (2003). In her
otherwise searching article, Professor Caruso puts too little emphasis on the current structural
incompatibility of Community law with protection of minority rights. It is not enough to say the
“complex legacy of the economic integration project” constitutes an “institutional limit”
burdening the “Union’s commitment to minority languages.” Id. at 358. The ethos of the
integration project has been universalizing and centered on individual rights, and not group
rights. This point is discussed in more detail below.
82. Palermo, supra note 2, at 299.
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albeit within its limited sphere of competences, such languages, and
some of its prominent efforts are described here.
1. Soft Law and Project Funding. The European Parliament,
for instance, passed four Resolutions between 1981 and 1994
83
In
regarding the situation of minority language communities.
84
response to the 1981 Resolution, Parliament created the European
85
Bureau of Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) in 1982. That same
year, Parliament initiated the B3-1006 budget line, entitled
“Promotion of Regional and Minority Languages,” which provides
86
funds for financing measures supporting minority languages.
Parliament used B3-1006 to finance projects to sustain regional and
minority languages, including the EUROMOSAIC network87 and
88
MERCATOR, and provided support for studies on the interface of
language and integration.89

83. See Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a
Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 1981 O.J. (C287) 106; Resolution on Measures in Favour
of Linguistic and Cultural Minorities, 1983 O.J. C68/103; Resolution on the Languages and
Cultures of the Regional and Ethnic Minorities in the European Community, 1987 O.J. (C318)
160 (regretting the lack of progress made in response to previous resolutions); Resolution on
Linguistic Minorities in the European Community, 1994 O.J. (C61) 110.
84. Called the “Arfé resolution” after the Italian Rapporteur, Gaetano Arfé. See
Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and on a Charter for Rights of
Ethnic Minorities, 1981 O.J. (C 287) 106-07.
85. The EBLUL has as its mission the promotion of active EC policy-making in favor of
regional or minority languages and the defense of linguistic rights. The languages EBLUL aim
to protect are indigenous, and do not include the languages of immigrant communities, or
dialects of official Member State languages. EBLUL considers itself to be representative of
over fifty million EU citizens. EBLUL is not a Community institution, but is funded mainly by
the Commission. See generally European Commission, Education and Training: Regional and
Minority
Languages,
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/eblul_
en.html (brief description of EBLUL’s history and mission, providing a link to the EBLUL
website).
86. A budget line is an addendum annually appropriated by the Parliament devoting funds
to an area of its choosing. Budget Line B3-1006 has been renewed every year since its
inception. See Gabriel von Toggenburg, The EU’s Endeavours for its Minorities, in MINORITY
RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 21, at 205, 214 n.30.
87. The EUROMOSAIC network combines resources and scholars from Barcelona’s
Institut de Sociolinguistica Catalana, the Centre du recherche sur le plurilinguisme in Brussels,
and Bangor’s Research Centre Wales. Id. at 215.
88. MERCATOR “is a computer database which aims to improve” the circulation of
information regarding minority languages within and without the EC. Adam Biscoe, The
European Union and Minority Nations, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE ‘NEW’ EUROPE 89, 102
n.48 (Peter Cumper & Steven Wheatley eds., 1999).
89. See id.
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More recently, the European Parliament and the Council of
Europe joined together to proclaim 2001 as the “European Year of
90
The Commission has also funded a number of
Languages.”
innovative education projects, covering not only the official languages
91
92
of the Community, but minority languages as well. The effect of
these and countless other measures the Community doubtless will
undertake cannot be measured. While their effect may escape us, the
undeniable message is to be applauded: the EC cares about minority
languages. However, in the end, these and other such programs lack
the strictures of legal norms and rules that the Member States already
have in place.
In July 2006, the European Parliament granted to speakers of
Catalán, Basque, or Galician the right to communicate with the EC
93
The success of the Spanish
legislature in their native language.
minorities is no doubt due in part to their strong domestic political
position, as well as the recent successes of the Catalán minority in
expanding its Statute of Autonomy. Excepting these Spanish
minority languages, parties may communicate with EC institutions
only in official EC languages.94 A recent report by the EC Parliament
Committee on Culture and Education called for all EC institutions to
“communicate with citizens in their own national” languages,
irrespective of the official status of the language at the EC or Member
State level.95
2. Article 151. The only hard treaty law prior to the Treaty of
Amsterdam even acknowledging the existence of minorities within
the EC is Article 151 of the EC Treaty, which instructs the
Community to “contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity
and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the

90. European Parliament and Council Decision 1934/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 232) 1 (EC).
91. There are twenty-one working languages of the Community—the official languages of
each Member State. On July 13, 2005, Irish was included as a working language effective
January 2007. See Andres Ortega, How Brussels is Coping with the growing Tower of Euro–
babel, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 26, 2006, at The Future of Europe 5.
92. Caruso, supra note 81, at 359.
93. SNP Bid to Boost Gaelic, ABERDEEN PRESS & J., July 6, 2006, at 4.
94. Cf. Biscoe, supra note 88.
95. Italian Draft Report on a New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, at 6, COM
(2005) 0569, June 29, 2006, available at http://eurolang.net/files/draft_multilingualism.pdf. The
Draft Report also calls for the amendment of EC Treaty Articles 13 and 151, the inadequacies
of which are discussed infra. See id. at 7.
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fore.”96 Article 151 also instructs the Community to “take cultural
aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this
Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote diversity of its
cultures.”97 Article 151 mirrors Article 22 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states that the
98
EU “shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” The
inclusion of Article 151 in the Maastricht Treaty evinces the
delegates’ concern with the effects of the integration project on
regional cultural diversity, but it does not constitute the clear
competence or mandate that the EC would need to act decisively and
affirmatively—as the Member States have done—in favor of
collective group rights for minorities.
In stark contrast to the core economic Community competences,
the impact of Article 151 has not produced significant results, and is
99
limited to the funding of a small handful of cultural projects.
Indeed, some scholars have argued that minorities have benefited
more from legislation passed under market-based treaty provisions—
relying on a chance confluence of market demands with group
100
demands for rights—than under Article 151 itself. If that is true, the
future of minority rights in the EC currently hangs in the balance
between an unsteady combination with market considerations on the
one hand, and on the other, a steady stream of funded projects with
debatable effects.
3. Protection of Minorities as Accession Criterion. The fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989 awakened the Community to the vital stake it
had in the stability and progress of its neighbors to the East.101 This
96. EC Treaty art. 151 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 22, 2000 OJ (C 364) 13.
The Charter is an ambitious set of commitments assented to by all three legislative-executive
institutions of the EC. It has no status as positive law at the moment, however. It has been
incorporated into the text of the EU Constitution. See discussion infra Part I.F.5.
99. The most influential programs have been merged into one program entitled
CULTURE 2000. See Palermo, supra note 2, at 300 n.6.
100. Id. at 300 (mentioning importance of Council Directive of 1977 which provides for
“education of children of migrant workers in their mother tongue”).
101. See FLORENCE BENOÎT-ROHMER, THE MINORITY QUESTION IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A
COHERENT SYSTEM OF PROTECTION FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES 30-31 (1996). BenoîtRohmer highlights the Pact on Stability (1995), a political undertaking (but not a treaty) signed
by the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as a momentous
achievement for its contribution to stability and management of border conflicts and minority
issues after the Yugoslav crisis. The European Union chaired the two regional round table
conferences.
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renewed interest found expression in the so-called European
102
Agreements with Central and Eastern European nations. In 1993,
at the Copenhagen Summit, the Council adopted a Commission
Report on enlargement that provided, inter alia, that a condition
precedent to any eventual accession to the E.C. was respect for and
protection of the rights of minorities.103 These conditions are now
embodied in the Community’s Association Agreements, which
104
The EU’s foreign
require the recognition of minority nations.
policy has focused on the protection of minorities in non-Member
States outside the accession context as well.105
Interestingly, there was (and is, pending acceptance of the EU
Constitution) no such requirement for the current Member States of
the European Union. Some commentators have criticized the Union,
alleging that the recognition of minority rights is an ideal to be
consumed abroad, but ignored in the internal market.106 Indeed,
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union replicates the relevant
language of the Copenhagen Agreements, but omits the reference to
the respect and protection of minorities.107 Protection of minority
rights is a sine qua non for admission into the EC, but once a state
enters, it seems, rights for the minorities residing within its
boundaries lose their legal protection. In a sense, the requirement

102. The European Agreements included Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
Bulgaria, and Romania. Biscoe suggests the interest in East Europe was motivated by a fear of
“right wing authoritarian and nationalist forces” intent on stepping into the power vacuum. See
Biscoe, supra note 88, at 97 (citing DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 478 (3d ed. 2005).
103. European Council, June 21-22, 1993, Copenhagen, Den., Presidency Conclusions, SN
180/93 [hereinafter Presidency Conclusions] (“Membership requires that the candidate country
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the Union.”) (emphasis
added).
104. Biscoe, supra note 88, at 97.
105. See id. passim.
106. See, e.g., Bruno de Witte, Politics Versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic
Minorities, in EUROPE UNBOUND: ENLARGING AND RESHAPING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 139 (Jan Zielonka ed., 2002) (defining the minority rights requirement as
“an export product and not one for domestic consumption”); Graínne De Burca, Beyond the
Charter: How Enlargement Has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the European Union, 27
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 679, 700-01 (2004).
107. Compare Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, as amended by
Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145 (“The Union is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the
rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”) with Presidency Conclusions,
supra note 103.
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emphasizes the blind spot within the EC framework: the EC
pressures future members to shore up constitutional and legal
protection for minorities ex ante, because it knows that once
admitted, such efforts are currently outside the scope of the Treaties,
108
and the EC will be powerless to address them.
4. Article 13. The Amsterdam Treaty included Article 13 at the
urging of those wishing to pressure the EC into solidifying a firm
109
That article applies the nonfoundation for social rights.
discrimination principle embedded in Article 12110 to a wider array of
situations. The text reads as follows:
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within
its limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
and after consulting the European Parliament, may take
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
111
orientation.

In granting the Community the competence “to take appropriate
action” to combat discrimination, Article 13 opens a new juridical
space for Community action. However, closer examination reveals
that unanimity is required112 for any action, and the limiting phrase
“within its limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community”
suggests a more modest scope than Article 12’s “within the scope of

108. It could be argued that the inclusion of a minority rights requirement in the accession
criteria, which are based on the common constitutional principles of the Member States, implies
the existence of a common constitutional obligation on the part of all, including current,
Member States. See Palermo, supra note 2, at 301. Such an argument may be internally
coherent, but the discussion supra on the Member States’ constitutional treatment of minorities
belies this point. There is great diversity in treatment, and some Member States still hold tight
to their “proclaimed homogeneity.” BENOÎT-ROHMER, supra note 101, at 18 (mentioning
France and Greece, in particular). But see Bruno de Witte, Surviving in Babel? Language
Rights and European Integration, in THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
277, 278 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1992) (“There seems to be a gradual emergence
of a common European standard for the treatment of linguistic minorities . . . .”).
109. Several European parliamentarians became advocates for minority groups in
Amsterdam. See von Toggenburg, supra note 86, at 228.
110. EC treaty art. 12. (“Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred
to in Article 251, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination.”).
111. Id. art. 13.
112. Some commissioners sought, unsuccessfully, to introduce qualified majority voting into
the Article 13 law-making process. Von Toggenburg, supra note 86, at 228 n.103.
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application of this Treaty.”113 Another limitation is the exclusively
consultative role held by the European Parliament, which is the
Community organ that minority groups can most easily access. A still
more fundamental limitation is the lack of competence for the EC to
114
enact measures of positive discrimination in favor of minorities.
Nevertheless, Article 13 moves in the right direction to
protection for minorities in two ways. First, the Article explicitly
recognizes that discrimination exists.
Article 13 instructs the
115
Community to “combat” a pre-existing problem. Second, Article 13
moves away from market criteria towards a substantive protective
competence for the EC institutions. Article 13 authorizes the
Community to take affirmative measures to eradicate discrimination
not just based on nationality, but on eight other categories of
difference.116 It is a small step, but an important one, in the
development of Community law with respect to minorities. Even
though it does not grant the EC carte blanche to legislate on behalf of
minority groups, Article 13 acknowledges the minority group
difference that exists in the EC,117 and incorporates it for the first time
in a grant of power to the Community institutions.
118
The
5. The EU Constitution and Minority Languages.
original Draft Constitution for the European Union, presented in July
119
Advocacy groups
2003, omitted any mention of minority rights.
mobilized to express outrage over the lacuna and obtained some
interesting language in the amended Constitutional Treaty currently
subject to popular approval in the respective Member States. Article
I-2 states, “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human

113. This is especially clear after the ECJ’s ruling in Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat
Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691, which greatly expanded the scope of Article 12 by a broad reading
of Article 18’s creation of EU citizenship. EC Treaty art. 12.
114. Von Toggenburg, supra note 86, at 230.
115. EC Treaty art. 13.
116. See id.
117. This acknowledgment isevident in the inclusion of discrimination based on “racial or
ethnic origin,” which would apply equally to non-EC minorities and autochthonous minorities
within the Member States. Implicit in the concept of discrimination based on “racial or ethnic
origin” is discrimination against a minority group.
118. The Treaty was signed by Council members on October 29, 2004, and is now open for
consideration by the various Member States. Following the “no” votes of France and the
Netherlands, the momentum for ratification has dissipated.
119. See generally European Convention, July 18, 2003, Draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution
for
Europe,
CONV
850/03,
available
at
http://europeanconvention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf.
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dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
120
minorities.” Structurally, this language is front and center: it is the
fourth sentence, and the second article, of the entire document.
However, closer examination reveals that it possesses more in
common with preambular language than anything else. The phrase is
descriptive and not prescriptive, and would not create a new
competence for Community action. Interestingly, the language
recalls the Copenhagen criteria for accession discussed supra, and
may correct the asymmetrical obligations inhering in those criteria.121
In so doing, the proposed Article I-2 may provide a “lowest common
denominator” for countries with abysmal records of protecting
minority rights. What—if any—the contours of such a minimum
obligation would be are not apparent from the text and due to the
general and descriptive quality of the language, it is likely not
susceptible to an expansive reading by the ECJ.122
Another passage merits attention. Article I-3(3) includes in a list
of the EU’s objectives a hortatory reminder to “respect its rich
cultural and linguistic diversity, and . . . ensure that Europe’s cultural
heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”123 This passage, unlike Article
I-2, formed part of the original July 2003 Draft Constitution. In it,
there is the first mention of linguistic diversity in an EU treaty.
However, the language largely tracks Article 151 and absent a more
specific command, is unlikely to create an EU competence to act on
behalf of minority languages.
Any discussion of the EU Constitution must at least
acknowledge the events of the Dutch and French “no” votes, and the
more general failure of the pro-Constitution forces to present a
124
compelling case in favor of ratification. The reasons for the “no”
votes, and the successive stalling of the ratification process, are
manifold. Whether voters were expressing their desire for “less
Europe” or for a more coherent Europe (meaning, “yes to Europe,
120. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. I-2, Oct. 24, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
1 [hereinafter European Constitution].
121. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text.
122. But see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 12-13 (2006)
(describing the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution as its most important language).
123. European Constitution, supra note 120, art. I-3(3).
124. In 2005, France and the Netherlands submitted the ratification to a referendum vote,
and voters rejected the proposed text soundly. See French Say Firm ‘No’ to EU Constitution,
BBC NEWS, May 30, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe4592243.stm; Dutch Say ‘No’ to EU
Constitution, BBC NEWS, June 2, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe4601439.stm.
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but not this Europe”) is a question up for debate,125 but it is
indisputable that the “no” advocates were able to tap into diffused
sentiment that held, rightly or wrongly, that the EC was distant from
its citizens.126 The perception that European integration means
homogenization of the Member States’ cultures and particularities is
a common theme that anti-Europe political forces, especially on the
Right, have made use of repeatedly.127 Of course, the “no” vote is too
complicated to be reduced to a mere nationalistic appeal to
sovereignty and identity, but the success of the anti-integration appeal
to “less Europe” depends in part on the EC’s own failure to take into
account the continued resonance and relevance of identity in the EU
citizenry.
This inadequacy is a broad phenomenon, mostly outside the
scope of this article. However, the conflict between individual and
group rights in the context of minority languages is one particular
manifestation of this broad failure. Solving the minority language
problem will do very little, in itself, to remedy the failure of the prointegration forces to construct a compelling narrative as to why
further integration is desirable, but to the extent that such an
approach allows the EC to develop a vocabulary sufficient to
accommodate non-market and cultural realities, it may contribute to
the discussion of European integration.

125. See TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, EUROPA: UNA PAZIENZA ATTIVA 36-38 (2006).
126. See, e.g., Saying “No” to EU Constitution, IRISH TIMES, June 14, 2005, at 17; Robert
Mason Lee, “Non” and Then “Nee,” MACLEAN’S, June 13, 2005, at 26; see also Andreas
Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone
and Moravcsik, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE PAPERS (EUROGOV), NO. C-05-02, at 4-6, available
at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-02.pdf; Peter L. Lindseth,
Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of
the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 655 (1999) (“The most fundamental
[weakness of the EC aspirations as a constitutional order] is that there is not yet any European
‘people’—no demos—in whom sovereignty can be said to have originally resided, which was
then constitutionally delegated the Community without going through the intermediation of the
Member States.”).
127. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Eurosceptics in Line for Major Breakthrough on Polling
Day, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 1, 2004, at 8.
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II. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN GROUP RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
A. Individual Versus Group Rights: Why the Distinction Matters
At this stage, it will be helpful to step back a bit and sketch the
boundaries of the categories of group rights and individual rights as
those terms are used in this Article. So far, it has surveyed some of
the protective strategies that Member States and the EC employ to
foster and protect autochthonous groups of minority language
speakers. The argument of this article is that some of these measures,
insofar as they are addressed to groups and not individuals, may
cause, or create the potential to cause, conflicts with core principles of
Community law, in particular the non-discrimination principle. These
measures are different in key respects from individual rights.
The generality of the phrase “group rights” may cause some
confusion.128 If we are to label group privileges as “rights,” then there
must be some action that separates these “rights” from, say, a mere
rhetorical appeal to a group or collectivity, with reference to a
normative prescription. A legal right, in general, “is an entitlement or
justified claim that a legal system recognizes” as legitimate according
to a “correct interpretation of its own rules and principles.”129 As the
term is used in this article, “group rights” refer to legal entitlements
or privileges, dispensed by the sovereign, to individuals by virtue of
their membership to a community. This definition necessarily
excludes the rights of a group to, say, self-determination or secession,
which are addressed to a group qua nation or “people.” The group
language rights that are of importance in the context of European
integration are vested in individuals, but are not available to all
individuals qua individuals. Instead, recourse to these rights is
conditioned on the existence of (1) a relevant group and (2) an
individual’s membership in that group. This concept of group rights,
then, recognizes linguistic minorities as a protectable group, but opts
to protect individuals belonging to the group rather than protecting
the group as such. In this vein, it is possible to speak of “group

128. An extensive discussion of the concept of group rights can be found in MARLIES
GALENKAMP, INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVISM: THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE
RIGHTS (1998).
129. Dwight G. Newman, Collective Interests and Collective Rights, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 127, 128
(2004).
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subjectivity” even though the rights are, sensu strictu, granted to
individuals.
A cursory discussion of the importance of the “individual” in
modern thought may provide a helpful background. Since World
War II and the establishing of the United Nations, individual rights
have displaced group rights as the dominant form of protecting
130
individuals. A U.N. study observed, with respect to the League of
Nations system of minority protection, that
[T]his whole system [of minority group protection] was overthrown
by the Second World War. All the international decisions reached
since 1944 have been inspired by a different philosophy. The idea
of a general and universal protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms is emerging. It is therefore no longer only
the minorities in certain countries which receive protection, but all
131
human beings in all countries[.]

Of course, the emphasis on the individual is hardly a twentiethcentury invention. One of the key characteristics of modernity is the
progressive privileging of the individual, in the religious and social, as
well as the juridical, realms.132 For instance, Christianity re-ordered
the individual’s relation to the cosmos by putting him in direct
communion with God. The Reformation was a further development
of modern religion’s emphasis on individual communion with the
133
134
divine. The Renaissance and the Enlightenment, too, are periods
thought of primarily in terms of their development of ideas of,
respectively, humanistic and rationalist individualism.
Radical

130. See James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the
State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 193, 206 (1999).
131. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/367, at 70 (1950).
132. See Victor Segesvary, Group Rights: The Definition of Group Rights in the
Contemporary Legal Debate Based on Socio-Cultural Analysis, 3 INT’L J. GROUP RTS. 89, 95
(1995) (discussing the “sacralization” of the individual).
133. See, e.g., JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY
98-119 (S.G.C. Middlemore trans., Penguin Books 1990) (1860); see also GIORGIO VASARI, THE
LIVES OF THE ARTISTS 49-81 (George Bull, trans., 1987) (describing the Renaissance as a
reawakening of painting from a long slumber spurred on by the individual genius of Tuscan
artists such as Cimabue and Giotto).
134. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (James
W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (Moral law requires that humans are
treated as ends in themselves, and never as means.); Allen W. Wood, The Supreme Principle of
Morality, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT & MODERN PHILOSOPHY 351, 352-54 (Paul
Guyer ed., 2006). In a different iteration of Enlightenment individualism, the “social contract”
models of both John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau liberate individuals from the natural law
framework and make their continued participation in society depend, at least theoretically, on
their consent.
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individualism in the form of subjectivism and existentialism
developed in the first half of twentieth century.
Unanchored from the values and roots that tied its constituent
135
groups together, European society in the period leading to the
Second World War witnessed a radical re-ordering of the State,
individuals, and groups. Despite their outward appeals to group
identity, the fascism and National Socialism that convulsed Europe in
the 1920s and 1930s were not so much a revival of group solidarity as
they were symptoms of a growing dissolution of traditional values
that were enforced in part by group accountability. The post-World
War II emphasis on individual rights results from a realization that
the dissolution of group solidarity left individuals powerless against
an almighty state.136
The free-market utopianism of twentieth-century liberalism is a
different movement in the same direction toward the dominion of the
individual. Individual rights have been used to drive the integration
of post-World War II Europe under the theory that economic
interdependence would eradicate nationalistic violence and empire
137
building. The EC can be conceptualized both as a contribution to,
and consequence of, an ever-increasing individual-centered legal
rights framework. Of course, these sketches are rendered with the
broadest of brushes, and are meant merely as a general evidence of

135. Martin Heidegger and Max Weber discuss this phenomenon at length from different
viewpoints. Compare Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in BASIC
WRITINGS 307 (David F. Krell, ed., William Lovitt trans., 1993) (1977) (warning that reliance on
technology threatens to “enframe” the entire human experience and undermine any conception
of human beings beyond functional means to an end) with Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 155 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946) (describing
modernity in terms of rationalization and intellectualization, which “disenchant” man from the
sense of religiosity that “in former times swept through the great communities like a firebrand,
welding them together”).
136. Hannah Arendt did not consider the modern state’s tendency to centralize and expand
political life to be, in and of itself, problematic. Instead, the totalitarian problem resulted when
nationalist ideology became conflated with the state. The atomized individualism inherited
from the nineteenth-century liberalism was connected to the state by the “solid cement of
national sentiment.” Hannah Arendt, The Nation, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING 1930-1945, at
206, 209 (Jerome Kohn, ed., 1994).
137. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW
3-5 (2002); Robert Schuman, Fr. Foreign Minister, Declaration of 9 May 1950 (May 9, 1950),
available at http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm (“The pooling of coal and steel
production will immediately provide for the setting-up of common bases for economic
development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those
regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they
have been the most constant victims.”).
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the deterioration of group solidarity and belonging in the modern
period.
138
However, the appeal to the group or collectivity still resonates.
Groups still “matter.” It is still possible to refer to ethnic or cultural
solidarity, and the importance of “cultural diversity” testifies to a
general recognition that we also see cultures and groups as irreducible
to mere aggregates of individuals. Some commentators have sought
to portray the EC as an inflexible mechanism moving towards
assimilation and normalization, to the detriment of particularities.139
This view has assumed the negative to be true as well: namely, that
group rights will, for better or worse, occasion an erosion of the
individual rights framework on which the European legal order is
premised. A basic assumption of this Article is that such a reductive
approach fails to appreciate the potential complementarity of
individual and group rights. Indeed, to the extent that failure to
accommodate minority languages into the Community legal
framework provides an excuse for otherwise integration-sympathetic
groups to subvert the integration process, the destiny of the EC may
be, in part, tied up with the destiny of minority language groups.140
An oft-cited example of a strong group rights language is found
in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which states:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the
right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
141
use their own language.

138. Dwight Newman provides the example of Québecois secession as an example of the
moral resonance of group-thinking. According to Newman, supporters of secession do not say
“there are seven million Québecois that desire secession, therefore secession is obligated.”
Instead, appeals to independence refer to a “distinct culture, a distinct identity, and so on.” See
Newman, supra note 129, at 145. Of course, the appeal to a group necessarily depends on a
multiplicity of persons, but the persuasiveness of the argument for a group right (for example, a
right to secession) does not depend on the number of persons. The relevance of numbers is at
best tangentially relevant.
139. Padoa-Schioppa discusses these critiques in EUROPA, supra note 125, at 70-72.
140. Cf. Addis, supra note 74, at 725-26 (“The choice, therefore, is not between national
unity on the one hand and the acknowledgement and affirmation of linguistic differences on the
other hand. Rather, the issue is what institutional structures would enable us to strengthen
national unity while affirming and cultivating linguistic diversity.”).
141. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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The rights themselves are vested in individuals, but only those
individuals who are members of a cultural group. Therefore, a
necessary precondition to the vesting of any rights under Article 27 in
individual “persons belong to . . . minorities” is the existence of a
142
group. Article 27 refers outward toward an extant cultural situation.
Because it relies on a descriptive state of cultural affairs, it is different
than merely a grant of group rights to certain collectivities. It is also
different than a general and universal individual right to associate,
because here, again, the law refers outward to certain extant groups.
Another example, discussed supra in Part I.B, is the Italian
Republic’s 1999 Law passed pursuant to Article 6 of the Italian
Constitution.
That law mandates certain guarantees that the
government must provide to members of enumerated cultural and
143
linguistic minorities. Indeed, that law in many respects goes much
further than Article 27. Not only does the law prevent discrimination
against members of certain minorities, but it also provides for
affirmative rights that members of the minority community may
invoke in public life.144
Victor Segesvary’s distinction here between sui generis group
rights and quasi-group rights is helpful. Sui generis group rights are
“derived from the constitution of a specific social and cultural
environment by groups of men, having its distinctive symbolic
orderings, belief- and value-systems, and particularly important,
shared historic experience.”145 Sui generis group rights are invoked so
that a community may flourish.146 The group language rights
discussed in this article are sui generis group rights. Quasi-group
rights (for example, rights for the disabled, gay rights) arise merely
because of accidental or biological facts that link the individuals
together into the group.147 There is no cultural commonality of
homosexual persons or disabled persons: there are merely
homosexual and disabled persons across numbers of cultures. The sui
generis group right aims to protect cultural or linguistic communities
as a legal subject independent of the individual members of that
148
group.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
See supra notes 24, 28-30 and accompanying text.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Segesvary, supra note 132, at 102.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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Other group or collective rights are based on the aggregative
interests of the individual members that constitute the group, and are
thus distinguishable from sui generis group rights. A labor union is an
example of such a collectivity. It may be important to protect the
right for labor to organize, but it makes no sense to say that the
United Auto Workers (UAW) itself has a right to exist. Instead, its
members each possess an individual right to organize. The right,
though, is functional, and does not depend on an extant situation, but
rather the possibility and potential for different organizations and
groupings in the future. In the case of a union, the “group” right is
merely an aggregative right of the individual members. If ever the
members decided that a greater number preferred a splinter union,
then the UAW would perhaps cease to exist, and no one would
lament the violation of its “rights.”
An illustrative example of a group right—as distinguished from a
mere aggregate of individual rights—is a special fishing right granted
149
to an indigenous community. Let us suppose that the state grants to
members of that community the right to fish in the salmon-rich
streams that run through the community’s traditional homeland yearround. These fishing rights are at once individual rights and group
rights. For any non-fishing individual, it may be sensible to trade his
rights for an alternative privilege or payment. More interestingly,
other individuals may garner a personal satisfaction, unrelated to
their community-belonging, from fishing. For example, maybe it is
cheaper to fish than to buy at market, or perhaps it is a day’s ride to
the next comparable stream. However, assuming the state could
grant some substitutive privilege or payment to compensate for the
aggregate individual interests, the individual would not suffer, but the
community would.150 In this example, the sui generis group right is
intended as the bulwark to protect the community from suffering even
if the individuals are “bought off.” The sui generis group right
recognizes the intrinsic value of the group and cannot be derived
from the rights of the individual members.151

149. See Newman, supra note 129, at 156-57.
150. See id. at 157.
151. Cf. Id. at 156 (“[W]e can say that his individual interests, while not wholly derivative
from, are nonetheless secondary to the primary collective interest.”).
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B. The EC and Individual Rights
From the perspective of the Member States, integration is
fundamentally a process of surrendering sovereignty. Member States
formerly exerted plenary powers over their internal markets, foreign
affairs, and borders; now, with the expansion of qualified majority
voting, the extent of Member State participation in those
fundamental competences can be as minimal as casting a losing vote
152
From the inception of the
against a majority of other states.
European Economic Community (EEC), minorities subject to the
centralized policies of the Member States “hoped that the progress
towards integration would occasion a diminution” of Member State
authority and a concomitant increase in autonomy for regions and the
minorities that often have greater leverage on the sub-state level.153
Expectations were high that the EC’s approach would create a oneway ratchet, moving inevitably to more minority protection.
The Community institutions have fallen short of these
aspirations, and Member States, discussed supra, have, with varying
success and enthusiasm, propped up the minority and regional
languages with a protective legal framework. The reason for the EC’s
failure is that the EC has opted for an individual rights—and not a
154
group rights —approach to realize its overarching goal that the
152. The ECJ, in Van Gend en Loos, describes the Community as “a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which states have limited their sovereign rights.” Case 26/62,
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. The EC has
become increasingly active in the day-to-day affairs of its citizens, having largely accomplished
its goal of market integration, and recently moving toward a substantive concept of citizenship.
See, e.g., Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691. The surrender of
state sovereignty in the field of application of the Treaties is necessary for the achievement of
the Treaties’ objectives. While such surrender was integral to the European economic
integration, the process exacted (and exacts today) a price on the protection of cultural and
linguistic minorities.
153. de Witte, supra note 108, at 277. Hopes that integration would allow for the
development of a “Europe of Regions” relied on a neofunctionalist conception of a EC that
forges connections and linkages between substate and suprastate groups that ultimately weaken
the exclusive power of the Member States. For an elaboration on the neofunctionalist
conception of integration, see generally Paul Craig, The Nature of the Community, in THE
EVOLUTION OF E.U. LAW 1, 49 ( Paul Craig & Gr’ainne de Búrca eds., 1999).
154. Nathan Glazer has written on these dueling approaches to rights of minorities in the
context of race in the United States. He suggests that multicultural nations (and by analogy,
supranational polities like the EC) all must engage in a debate over which rights approach to
take to further justice. See NATHAN GLAZER, ETHNIC DILEMMAS: 1964-1982, at 254-70 (1983).
A similar debate has raged the past few decades in American Equal Protection jurisprudence.
For the most part, the Supreme Court has taken an individual rights approach to the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267
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“internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is
155
ensured.” Individual market actors are the constitutive atoms of the
European Union. Minority group rights, which have been the subject
of so much Member State law, do not fit easily into—and indeed may
be at odds with—this market-based framework.156 The concept of sui
generis group rights—and the idea that linguistic minorities may be
irreducible legal subjects—has not yet entered into the mainstream
vocabulary of Community institutions.
Europe’s legal space is now defined by two sets of actors (EC
institutions and Member State governments) and the resulting form
of governance has naturally had an effect on citizens’ rights. The
transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the Community
interrupts the relationship between the individual and the state as
157
The ECJ has held that the European treaties
dispenser of rights.
create directly effective rights that individuals can rely on against
158
their Member States and EC institutions. These legal entitlements
are the implements that have driven the economic integration of
Europe. The directly effective Community economic rights, however,
have collateral reverberations felt throughout Europe as a community
of nations or language groups (as distinguished from a community of
markets), and despite the EC’s undeniable overtures to minority
(1980); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). However, dicta from the Court’s recent decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), may suggest an increased willingness to look at group rights, at
least for a period of time. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (Justice O’Connor’s comment that the
court “expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary” seems to suggest that a group rights approach may be necessary for a period of
time).
155. EC Treaty art. 14(2).
156. Biscoe believes the “ethos of European integration” sees regional cultural diversity as
“an optional extra” which is sacrificed in the drive to create the single market and the
perception of a need to remain competitive in the global economy. Biscoe, supra note 88, at 90.
Where marketplace issues conflict with cultural diversity, the market will always win. He closes
his article with a remonstration to minority groups: “Minority nations, and multi-nation states
which are concerned that European economic integration has implications for their cultural
diversity, should take note.” Id. at 99.
157. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Citizenship and Post-National Rights in Europe, 51 INT’L SOC.
SCI. J. 11 (1999). Professor Bhabha sees in European integration a useful context to examine
the interaction between the role of the state and the role of supranational bodies in enforcing
citizens’ rights.
158. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
1963 E.C.R. 1. Moreover, the EC Treaty creates rights that may be invoked to limit private
actions as well. See also Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation
Aérienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
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groups,159 these effects can destabilize the group rights framework of
the Member States. This destabilizing effect will only amplify as EC
individual rights continue to expand beyond traditional marketoriented rights into substantive social and political norms. This
160
phenomenon will be discussed infra in more depth, but for the
moment it suffices to point out that some domestic rules that aim to
ensure group language rights are bound to conflict with fundamental
principles of Community law. The EC’s approach to minority
language has been handicapped by its failure to recognize the sui
generis subjectivity of language groups. The individualist emphasis of
the Community institutions is a major cause for this failure.
C. Articles 12 and 39
161

162

EC Treaty articles 39 and 12 exemplify how individual
economic rights at the Community level can conflict with Member
States’ efforts to protect groups of citizens. Both articles prohibit
discrimination on the basis of nationality and are among the most
163
important to the integration effort. Article 39’s prohibition aims to
secure the freedom of movement for workers, and Article 12 is a
general prohibition of such discrimination “within the scope of
application” of the Treaty. Article 12 has been described as a right to
equal treatment, while Article 39 has been considered more limited,

159. See supra discussion Part I.F. See also de Witte, supra note 108, at 288. Prof. de Witte
posits that the prevailing ethos at the various EU intergovernmental conferences was that
economic integration affected linguistic communication only informally, in contrast to the
formal political decision to focus on a common market. Id. His article was written in 1992, so
one must wonder if his impressions were different at the Amsterdam conference. Id.
160. See infra discussion Part IV.
161. Article 39 provides that “freedom of workers shall be secured within the Community.”
Moreover, “such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and
other conditions of work or employment.” EC Treaty art. 39. Article 39 has direct effect, but
was also implemented by Regulation 1612/68. See Case C-36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the
Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219. This article also has horizontal direct effect, as established in Case
C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139 paras. 34-36.
162. Article 12 provides, “Within the scope of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited.” EC Treaty art. 12.
163. Prof. John Handoll anticipated the import of Article 39 (then Article 48) when he
wrote that the ECJ’s approach to Article 39 in the decades before Martinez Sala reflected the
underlying belief that a “worker is more than a just worker; he is an embryonic Community
citizen.” John Handoll, Article 48(4) EEC and Non-National Access to Public Employment, 13
EURO. L. REV. 223, 240 (1988).
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as it applies only to workers.164 Paragraph 4 exempts public service
employment from the scope of Article 39, in addition to general
165
public policy, security, and health. The commitment to creating a
single frontier-less market relies on a mobile labor supply moving
efficiently and without obstacles to where it is valued most. Articles
12 and 39 aim to make free supply of labor a reality by vesting rights
with individual workers and EU citizens.166 By eradicating parochial
discrimination in the labor market, the EC not only ensures fair
167
treatment, but affirmatively encourages the movement of workers.
An obvious conflict between Article 39 and a Member State
minority group right would be a hypothetical rule passed by the
autonomous Spanish region of Catalonia requiring local businesses to
employ a specified percentage of Catalonian residents in factories.
Article 3 of Regulation 1612/68 explains that even “indirect”
discrimination on the basis of nationality is prohibited under Article
168
39. Thus, such a provision would be a clear violation of Regulation
1612/68 since Catalonian residents are predominantly Spanish
citizens. Such a law would threaten the free movement of workers
that Article 39 and Regulation 1612/68 aim to achieve. Such a law
would patently be designed to have a protectionist, anti-integration
discriminatory effect that benefits a group at the expense of
individual labor market actors. The nexus between the hypothetical
law and Article 39 is all too clear.

164. Annette Schrauwen, Sink or Swim Together? Developments in European Citizenship,
23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 778, 780 (2000).
165. See EC Treaty art. 39(4). The ECJ case law has all but read the exceptions out of the
text of Article 39 and their implementing directive 64/221. For example, in Rutili the court held
that in order for the public policy exception to apply, the discrimination must be justified by
Community public policy concerns, not Member State concerns. Rutili, 1975 E.C.R. at 1223.
See also Case C-33/88, Allué v. Università di Venezia, 1989 E.C.R. 1591 para. 7 (limiting “public
service” exception to the exercise of “direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers
conferred by public law and . . . the discharge of functions whose purpose is to safeguard the
general interests of the State or of other public authorities and which therefore require a special
relationship of allegiance to the State on the part of persons occupying them and reciprocity of
rights and duties which form the bond of nationality”).
166. “For example, if a Spaniard cannot get a job as a machinist in Germany because there
are arbitrary language requirements, or because the local council will not provide housing, or
because his Moroccan wife will be excluded, or because he has to purchase costly visa
requirements, then his free movement will be hampered.” Bhabha, supra note 157, at 14.
167. See e.g., Á. Castro Oliveira, Workers and Other Persons: Step-By-Step from Movement
to Citizenship, Case Law 1995-2001, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 77 (2002).
168. Regulation 1612/68, 1968 J.O. (L 257) 1 (EEC).
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Article 12 articulates a broad commitment to anti-discrimination
169
The key
“within the scope of application of [the EC] Treaty.”
question, then, is how far the EC Treaty’s “scope of application”
extends. If the “scope of application” of the Treaty extends beyond
workers’ freedom of movement, then Article 12 sweeps even more
broadly than Article 39. To the extent that Article 12 embodies the
same principle but applies it to a wider range of conduct, Article 12
will only increase in relevance. By corollary, the non-discrimination
principle will apply to an increasing array of Member State acts, many
of which may not facially seem implicated by the Treaty at all.
Recent cases have confirmed that this is true.170 The expanding
“scope of application” of the Treaty results from the citizenship
concept introduced to the EC Treaty at Maastricht.171
D. Martinez Sala and The Expansion of Individual Citizenship
Rights
172

The ECJ, in the 1998 Martinez Sala case, interpreted Article 12
as applying to all citizens residing lawfully in a Member State. Ms.
Sala, a Spanish citizen, had resided in Germany for over thirty years,
and had been receiving social welfare benefits in the form of a child173
She had entered Germany to work,
raising allowance since 1986.
but she had been unemployed for over a decade.174 She had applied
for a German residence permit, which the authorities were disinclined
175
She then applied for her welfare benefits.176 The
to give her.
welfare authorities required Ms. Sala to produce a residence permit,177
which she could not, of course, do. All persons legally resident in the
country were eligible for the benefit, but German citizens were
required only to prove their residence, and foreign nationals had to

169. EC Treaty art. 12.
170. See infra discussion Part II.C.
171. The Treaty of Maastricht contained, for the first time, a provision on EU citizenship.
That provision is now found in EC Treaty art. 18.
172. See supra note 113.
173. Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691 paras. 2-4.
174. Id.
175. See id. para. 14. The German authorities had their hands tied because they did not
want to issue the permit to a non-worker, but were prohibited from repatriating her by Article
6(a) of the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance. See id. paras. 11-12, 14.
176. Id. para. 15.
177. Id. para. 16.
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produce a residence permit.178 Not being able to produce the permit,
179
she was denied the benefits.
The ECJ ruled that requiring an EU citizen to produce a
residence permit when German citizens were not so required
constituted impermissible discrimination on the basis of nationality in
180
violation of Article 12. Recalling that Article 12 applies “within the
scope of application of the Treaty,” the ECJ had to decide which
181
aspects of the EC Treaty were implicated. The ECJ held that the
child-raising allowance was a family benefit under Regulations
182
1612/68 and 1408/71 and thus fell within the scope of the Treaty.
Most striking, though, was the ECJ’s separate finding that citizenship
alone, and not worker status, brought Ms. Sala within the scope of the
Treaty: “As a national of a Member State, lawfully residing in the
territory of another Member State, [Ms. Sala] . . . comes within the
scope ratione personae of the provisions of the Treaty on European
citizenship.”183 The implication of the holding in Martinez Sala is that
the individual right to equal treatment attached to the mere fact of
EU citizenship.184 No longer, it seems, would the ECJ require a nexus
between the discrimination and the exercise of a community
economic right (for example, Article 39 and freedom of movement
for workers). In the post-Martinez Sala EC, a Member State must
beware not only of enacting measures that may impede the exercise
of individual economic rights, but also of discriminating against any
EU citizens who happen to be in the country legally—even casually.
Subsequent cases have confirmed this strong view of EU
citizenship as a political and social, and not merely economic, right.
The Trojani case, for example, involved a French national applying
for social assistance benefits in Belgium.185 The ECJ directed the
Belgian courts to determine whether the petitioner fell within the
ambit of any of Articles 39, 43 (applying to the freedom of
establishment), or 49 (applying to the freedom to provide services) of

178. Id. paras. 49-50.
179. Id. paras. 16-17.
180. Id. paras. 64-65.
181. Id. para. 62.
182. Id. paras. 39-45.
183. Id. para. 61.
184. The EU Constitution, if ratified, would make this principle of individual rights flowing
from citizenship explicit in the Treaty text.
185. Case C-456/02, Trojani v. Centre Public d’Aide Social de Bruxelles, 2004 E.C.R. I07573 paras. 9-10 (Sept. 7, 2004).
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the EC Treaty.186 However, even if the Belgian courts answered that
question negatively, the ECJ observed that
a citizen of the [European] Union who does not enjoy a right of
residence in the host Member State under Articles 39 EC, 43 EC or
49 EC may, simply as a citizen of the Union, enjoy a right of
residence there by direct application of Article 18(1) EC. The
exercise of that right is subject to the limitations and conditions
referred to in that provision. . . . However, once it is ascertained
that a person in a situation such as that . . . is in possession of a
residence permit, he may rely on Article 12 EC in order to be
187
granted social assistance benefit[s.]

The ECJ cited to Martinez Sala and Trojani in the 2005 case Queen
188
(on the application of Dany Bidar) v. London Borough of Ealing.
In Bidar, the Court summarized the Trojani case as establishing that
“a citizen of the Union who is not economically active may rely on
the first paragraph of Article 12 EC where he has been lawfully
resident in the host Member State for a certain time or possesses a
residence permit.”189 Bidar held that an EU citizen’s rights under
Article 12 prohibited the United Kingdom from conditioning receipt
of subsidized school loans on a student’s “settlement” in the
country.190 The British government conceded that under the terms of
the “settlement” provision of the loan regulation, most non-British
Community students would be “unsettled” despite being legally
resident in the country.191 The ECJ expressly disavowed the holdings
192
193
in the earlier Lair and Brown cases, which had held that the
assistance was primarily related to education and social policy and
therefore not within the scope of the Treaty.194

186. Id. para. 27.
187. Id. para. 46; accord Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale, 2001
E.C.R. I–6193 (“[A] citizen of the European Union, lawfully resident in the territory of a host
Member State, can rely on Article 6 [now Article 12] of the Treaty in all situations which fall
within the scope ratione materiae of Community law. Those situations include those involving
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and those involving the
exercise of the right to move and reside freely in another Member State, as conferred by Article
8a [now Article 18] of the Treaty.”).
188. See Case C-209/03, In Re Dany Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing paras. 23, 27, 2005
E.C.R. I-2119.
189. Id. para. 37.
190. Id. para. 63.
191. Id. para. 67.
192. Case C-39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover, 1988 E.C.R. I-3161.
193. Case C-197/86, Brown v. Sec’y of State for Scotland, 1988 E.C.R. I-3205.
194. Id. para. 38-39; Lair, 1988 E.C.R. I-3161 para. 15.
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Moreover, in 2004, the European Council and the European
Parliament promulgated Directive 2004/38, which governs the free
195
Thus, in part, Directive 2004/38
movement of EU citizens.
supplants Regulation 1612/68, discussed supra in Part II.C, which
addressed the free movement of workers—a more limited subset of
individuals.196 The directive provides inter alia standards according to
which “Union citizens” (defined as nationals of a Member State) are
to be permitted entry to, residence in, and exit from other Members
States.197 Importantly, the directive creates a near-absolute “right of
residence” during the three months following entry into the host
198
Member State. Beyond three months, EU citizens may remain in a
host Member State provided they are studying (with health
insurance), working, conducting business, or even merely in
possession of sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the
host Member State’s social assistance system.199 Most important for
our purposes is Article 24.1, which codifies the equal treatment
principle flowing from Martinez Sala:
Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in
the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the
basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State
shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State
200
within the scope of the Treaty.

While the directive does provide the ubiquitous general reservations
201
for “public policy, public security or public health,” there is no
exception for group-protective measures designed to protect minority
202
languages.
Martinez Sala and Directive 2004/38 affect the minority language
problem only by implication. Ms. Sala, for instance, had nothing to
do with Germany’s efforts to protect languages or minorities; she was
denied a simple welfare benefit and the ECJ found that denial was in
violation of her rights as an EU citizen to be free from
203
Before evaluating the impact of Martinez Sala’s
discrimination.
expansive concept of citizenship on Member State protections of
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Council Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158).
See id. See also Regulation 1612/68, supra note 168.
See Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 195, arts. 5-7.
See id. art. 6.1.
Id. art. 7.1.
Id. art. 24.1 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 27.1.
See generally id.
Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691 para. 23.
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minority languages, it is necessary to survey the actual ECJ rulings in
cases where group language rights collide with individual Community
rights.
III. MAJOR ECJ CASES ADDRESSING CONFLICT BETWEEN
MINORITY LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The ECJ interprets the European treaties, and to the extent a
Member State law limits the full enjoyment of the freedoms and
rights provided by the treaties and Community law, the ECJ is
charged with affirming the supremacy of Community law204 and
declaring the domestic measure to be in conflict. The ECJ decisions
in this field have articulated and defined the principles of nondiscrimination and freedom of workers and persons. Since the
treaties are concerned with individual rights, the ECJ in its role as
treaty interpreter, has usually found Member State measures to
protect language groups in violation of Community law.
A. The Groener205 Case
The Groener case involved a 1979 Irish Ministry of Education
regulation that required schoolteachers to pass an Irish language
proficiency exam as a precondition to attaining a permanent post.206
When Ms. Groener, a Dutch national and art teacher, failed her test,
she was denied a position over the objection of the school that desired
to hire her.207 Groener alleged that the regulation violated Article 39
(then Article 48) and, in particular, was not justified by Article 3(1) of
the implementing Regulation 1612/68 which permits states to
condition employment on linguistic knowledge when “required by
reason of the nature of the post to be filled.”208

204. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the European treaties do not contain an explicit textual
foundation for the supremacy of Community law. The ECJ has guided the affirmation of
Community supremacy through its case law. See Case 6/65, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per
L’Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that in cases of conflict, Community law
must be supreme over domestic law because to hold otherwise would render the direct
applicability and direct effect of Community law meaningless). Costa also reminded Member
States that, by entering into the EC, they have limited their sovereign rights. Id.
205. Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ.
Comm., 1989 E.C.R. 3967.
206. See id. para. 2.
207. See id.
208. See id. para. 3; see also Regulation 1612/68, supra note 168, art. 3(1).
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The ECJ held that the regulation did not violate Community law
for a combination of reasons. The Court attached importance to the
209
official primary constitutional status of the Irish language. Pointing
out the concerted effort by the Irish government to preserve and
promote its linguistic heritage, the Court also warned Ireland not to
go too far:
The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the
protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is
both the national language and the first official language.
However, the implementation of such a policy must not encroach
upon a fundamental freedom such as that of the free movement of
workers. Therefore, the requirements deriving from measures
intended to implement such a policy must not in any circumstances
be disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued and the manner in
which they are applied must not bring about discrimination against
210
nationals of other Member States.

The requirement of proportionality211 was met in Groener for two
reasons. First, the “privileged relationship” between a teacher and
students allowed Article 3(1) to apply beyond instructors teaching the
Irish language.212 Ireland wanted to protect and promote the
language, not merely to teach it, and requiring all teachers to be
competent would encourage spoken Irish in the halls, during recess,
and in other classes. Second, the regulation required competency, not
fluency, in Irish. A requirement of fluency, the Court suggested,
could be “disproportionate in relation to the objective pursued.”213
The Court also warned that any requirement that the language
certification be acquired within the Member State would be a
violation of the principle of non-discrimination.214
At the time, the Groener decision was welcomed cautiously by
advocates for minority languages and rights. It appeared the ECJ
signed off on a regulation aimed to protect the Irish language
notwithstanding the clear disadvantage to non-Irish teachers
searching employment in Ireland. The decision considered the Irish
language as a subject that could be legally protected. Perhaps more
209. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
210. Groener, 1989 E.C.R. 3967 para. 19 (emphasis added).
211. Prof. Shuibhne compares the cautious proportionality inquiry to a “general
international” trend regarding affirmative action. See Shuibhne, supra note 6, at 71.
212. To so require would, as Advocate General Darmon pointed out in his opinion, “treat
[Irish] as a dead language like [A]ncient [G]reek or [L]atin, and as a language incapable of
further development.” Groener, 1989 E.C.R. 3967, Opinion of AG Darmon para. 22.
213. Id. para. 21.
214. Id. paras. 31-33.
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importantly, the ECJ was willing to recognize that encouraging the
usage of minority languages contributed collaterally and indirectly to
the flourishing of the language’s speakers.
Commentators wondered how far the Court was willing to
extend this logic. Was the ECJ willing to provide a “real recognition
of the legitimacy of national concerns in relation to national cultural
215
Or was this case an outlying situation, limited to the
heritage?”
Irish anomaly of constitutional recognition and primacy of the
minority group’s language? Would the same analysis hold when the
language was protected only regionally? The subsequent cases
dispelled hopes that the ECJ was willing to recognize a general
Member State interest in providing sui generis group rights to
minority language speakers.
B. The Bickel/Franz216 Case
217

Bickel/Franz came before the ECJ on a preliminary reference
from a criminal court in the Trentino-Alto Adige region of Italy on
218
Article 100 of the Statute for the region219
the Austrian border.
provided a special right for German-speaking residents of the region
220
to have any legal proceedings against them conducted in German.
Bickel, who was an Austrian lorry driver, was being prosecuted for
221
Franz, a German tourist, had been
driving under the influence.
charged with possession of an illegal weapon after a customs search.222
Neither spoke Italian, and accordingly petitioned the Italian court to
223
conduct the proceedings in German. The Italian court referred the
following question to the ECJ:
Do the principle of non-discrimination as laid down in the first
paragraph of Article 6 [now Article 12], the right of movement and

215. Bryan M.E. McMahon, Case Comment, Groener, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 129, 139
(1990). If so, as Prof. McMahon asserted triumphantly, “The bureaucrats and the economists
will have to recognize that cultural diversity cannot be indiscriminately . . . [swept] in the name
of economic unity.” Id.
216. Case C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637.
217. See EC Treaty art. 234.
218. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 paras. 1-4.
219. See supra discussion Part I.C.
220. Special Statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige Region, Presidential Decree No. 670/1992,
art. 100, available at http://www.regione.taa.it/GIUNTA/normativa_it/statuto/statuto_
speciale.pdf. Cf. supra Part I.C.
221. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 3.
222. Id. para. 4.
223. Id. para. 5.

03__WEBER.DOC

400

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

10/4/2007 9:52:56 AM

[Vol 17:361

residence for citizens of the Union as laid down in Article 8a [now
Article 18] and the freedom to provide services as laid down in
Article 59 [now Article 49] of the Treaty require that a citizen of
the Union who is a national of one Member State but is in another
Member State be granted the right to have criminal proceedings
against him conducted in another language where nationals of the
224
host State enjoy that right in the same circumstances?

The ECJ separated the referral into two questions: first, did the right
at question implicate the Treaty?; and second, if the treaty was
implicated, could the region limit the application of that right to
225
residents of the region?
The Court ruled that the regulation did implicate the individual
226
Treaty rights of Bickel and Franz. Article 12 required that in any
situation governed by Community law, EU citizens be placed on
“equal footing” with citizens of the respective Member States.227 The
“linguistic rights and privileges of individuals” merited the Court’s
228
The mere fact that Bickel and Franz were EU
strictest attention.
citizens exercising their right to free movement under Article 18 of
229
the EC Treaty implicated the Treaty and as such, the prohibition of
discrimination contained in Article 12 applied.230 The Court also
relied on Article 49, and the freedom to receive services, as an
231
alternate basis for asserting jurisdiction. The Treaty applied despite

224. Id. para. 11.
225. The ECJ, not to be outdone in prolixity, reformulated the referral thus: “the national
court is essentially asking whether the right conferred by national rules to have criminal
proceedings conducted in a language other than the principal language of the State falls within
the scope of the Treaty and must accordingly comply with Article [12] thereof. If so, the
national court also asks whether Article [12] of the Treaty precludes national rules, such as
those in issue, which, in respect of a particular language other than the principal language of the
Member State concerned, confer on citizens whose language is that particular language and who
are resident in a defined area the right to require that criminal proceedings be conducted in that
language, without conferring the same right on nationals of other Member States traveling or
staying in that area, whose language is the same.” Id. para. 12.
226. See id. para. 14.
227. Id.
228. Id. para. 13 (emphasis added).
229. Article 18 is the same provision the ECJ relied on, that same year, to decide Martinez
Sala.
230. Id. para. 17. In Bickel/Franz, the ECJ refers to Article 6, which was the precursor to
Article 12. After the judgment came down, virtually all the treaty articles were renumbered by
the Treaty of Amsterdam. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 137, at 23.
231. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 15.
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the fact that criminal proceedings are normally an internal affair,
232
reserved to the exclusive discretion of the Member States.
In response to the second question, the ECJ found the
discrimination to be in violation of Article 12 non-discrimination
233
The Italian government, in its brief, stressed that the
principle.
scope of the right was to accommodate an insular minority, and its
aim was “to recognize the ethnic and cultural identity of persons
belonging to the protected minority.”234 Essentially, the Italian
government staked its case on a group rights justification. Its
argument implicitly recognized the rights of Bickel and Franz qua
Community citizens, but contended that those rights were satisfied by
the availability of translators.235 The special right reserved for
German-speaking residents did not apply to nonresident German
speakers simply because those persons were not part of the minority
group Italy aimed to protect.236 The Court instead focused on the
reality that, on the ground, and regardless of Italy’s motivation,
German-speakers from Austria and Germany were at a disadvantage
compared to German-speaking Alto Adige residents.237 The Court
232. The ECJ had already held that Community law set certain limits to the discretion of
Member States in the field of criminal law. See Case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public, 1989
E.C.R. 195; see also Case 137/84, Ministère Publique v. Heinrich Maria Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R.
2681. In Cowan, a British national, exercising his Community right to receive services in
France, was injured and sought compensation pursuant to a French penal law that provided
restitution to victims of assault. Cowan, 1989 E.C.R. 195 paras. 2-3. The ECJ held that France
must extend the privilege to the British national in order to avoid violating Article 12. Id. para.
20. Additionally, in Mutsch, a German-speaking Luxembourg national was arrested in Belgium
and sought to have proceedings conducted in German as Belgian law allows for Germanspeaking Belgian citizens. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681 paras. 2-3. The Court drew on Article 39
and the free movement of workers guaranteed by Regulation 1612/68 and ruled that Belgium
could not deny Mutsch, a lawful resident worker in Belgium, the right to have proceedings
conducted in German. Id. paras. 14-18. It will be observed that Bickel/Franz brings a nearly
identical legal issue before the court, with the key difference being the non-applicability of
Article 39 and the freedom of movement for workers.
233. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 31.
234. Id. para. 21.
235. See id.
236. The same argument was put forward by the Italian government when it intervened in
the Mutsch case. See Palermo, supra note 2, at 304-05. See also Andrea Gattini, La non
discriminazione di cittadini comunitari nell’uso della lingua nel processo penale: il caso Bickel, 82
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 106, 107 (1999) (“Il principale argomento avanzato dal
Governo era che le norme nazionali adottate a tutela di una minoranza ufficialmente
riconosciuta potessero riguardare soltanto le persone appartenenti a detta minoranza e residenti
nella zona in cui fosse insediata.”).
237. See Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 25 (“The majority of Italian nationals whose
language is German are in a position to demand that German be used throughout the
proceedings in the Province of Bolzano, because they meet the residence requirement laid down
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framed Article 100 as a protection of German-speakers in Alto
Adige; the Italian government claimed Article 100 protected only
members of the Alto Adige German-speaking minority.
In its decision, the Court reaffirmed that for a residence
requirement to be permissible under Community law, it must be
based on objective criteria independent of nationality as well as
238
proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions.
Furthermore, the Court repeated what it had stated in Groener:
protecting a linguistic minority is a legitimate objective.239 In this case,
however, the Court found Article 100 of the Statute to be
disproportionate since the rights could be extended with little
expense to cover German-speaking nationals of other Member States
240
To summarize
exercising their right to freedom of movement.
Advocate General Jacobs’ argument, protecting a local linguistic
minority is perfectly in harmony with the Treaty, but denying visitors
the right to use German was neither necessary nor appropriate to
achieve that goal.241 The Court agreed with the Advocate General,
noting, “It does not appear . . . from the documents before the Court
that that aim would be undermined if the rules in issue were extended
to cover German-speaking nationals of other Member States
exercising their right to freedom of movement.”242
For those waiting for the ECJ to adopt a hands-off approach
regarding Member State protections of minority languages in the
aftermath of Groener, Bickel/Franz is a staggering blow. For
Austrian and German tourists who cross the frontier into TrentinoAlto Adige to enjoy the mountains (and all other EU citizens who are

by the rules in issue; the majority of German–speaking nationals of other Member States, on the
other hand, cannot avail themselves of that right because they do not satisfy that
requirement.”).
238. Id. para. 27.
239. Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ.
Comm., 1989 E.C.R. 3967 paras. 18-19.
240. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 29. Remember that the region already had a
bilingual judiciary in place.
241. See id., Opinion of A.G. Jacobs para. 41. See also Barry Doherty, Bickel—Extending
the Boundaries of European Citizenship?, 8 IR. J. EUR. L. 70, 77-78 (1999) (providing a cogent
summary of the A.G.’s arguments); Gattini, supra note 236, at 114 (discussing the A.G.’s
opinion in detail).
242. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 29.
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more comfortable with German than Italian),243 the case is a welcome
244
gesture.
Notably absent from the ECJ opinion was consideration of the
intentional discriminatory effect of the law. Article 100 was included
in the Statute to guarantee an efficient and comprehensible trial for
German-speaking residents; it was also intended to accommodate an
insular group of German-speakers living in Trentino-Alto Adige, not
the casual tourist whose links to the region are ephemeral.
Throughout the opinion, the Court never considers the real policy
impetus behind Article 100: to protect the German-speaking minority
group against outside influences (as provided by the Italian
Constitution) including (one could even say especially) other
245
The Court’s pronouncements on the per se
German-speakers.
validity of measures to protect linguistic minorities ring hollow if the
Court is disinclined to consider the very reason for their existence.
Bickel/Franz suggests that the ECJ is ready to intervene when
Member State rules designed to protect minority groups conflict with
the exercise of individual Community rights. In Bickel/Franz, the
ECJ elides the real purpose of the provision in question, and focuses
exclusively on the effect on individuals. It may be objected that
Article 100 deals with criminal proceedings, and has little to do with
preserving culture; the other side of that coin is equally true: even if
the right is extended to non-residents, no harm is done to the region’s
interests and purposes. It is not clear whether extending the language
right in this case to all German speakers will attenuate the right’s
force vis-à-vis the German-speaking Alto Adige denizens.246
However, when combined with the EC’s expansion from a purely
economic union into a social and political union bound together by
citizenship, the effects of the ECJ’s failure to countenance group
rights as a sui generis legal subject can hardly be underestimated.

243. See Doherty, supra note 241, at 77 (“Behind this dense formulation is an unresolved
question: what does it mean to say that a person’s language is German? [T]he concept is
curiously undefined.”).
244. Christoph J.M. Safferling, Case Comment, In Re Bickel and Franz, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
155, 159 (2000).
245. Palermo notes, “Since the South Tyrol [Alto Adige] arrangement is so complex and
based mainly on the protection of a minority group against outside influences, particularly by
making immigration to South Tyrol difficult, it is not surprising that portions of this legislation
conflict with EC law.” Palermo, supra note 2, at 309.
246. In this case, there was no evidence that extending the right to all German speakers
would increase court costs. See Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 30.
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Indeed, the deleterious effects of such an approach are presented in
the Angonese case, discussed next.
247

C. The Angonese Case
In Angonese, the ECJ had occasion to reexamine the conflict in
Groener between non-discriminatory access to employment against
the legitimacy of procedures for gauging linguistic competence. In
that case, the Court again fielded a preliminary reference from a local
248
The case involved an
Italian court in Trentino-Alto Adige.
applicant to a position at a local private bank, the Cassa di Risparmio
249
di Bolzano. Roman Angonese applied to enter into a competition
for advertised positions at the bank.250 The advertisement stipulated
that candidates needed to possess a certificate—called the patentino—
251
as proof of their linguistic competence in both German and Italian.
The bank would not accept any other form of certification and the
province of Bolzano, capital of the Alto Adige, was the only authority
that administered the patentino examination.252
When Angonese presented his application, complete with
documentation from his university training in Vienna that testified to
his bilinguism, the bank denied him because he did not produce the
253
He then brought suit in the local Italian court in
patentino.
Bolzano, alleging that the denial of his application violated Article 39
as well as Regulation 1612/68. The local court referred the following
question to the ECJ:
Is it compatible with Article [39] (1), (2), and (3) of the EC
Treaty . . . to make the admission of candidates for a competition
organised to fill posts in a company governed by private law
conditional on possession of the official certificate attesting to
knowledge of local languages issued exclusively by a public
254
authority of a Member State . . . ?

247. Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139.
248. Id. para. 1.
249. This summary of the facts is based on the reported opinion and a case comment. See
Robert Lane & Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Case Comment, Angonese, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
1237, 1237 (2000).
250. Angonese, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139 para. 5.
251. Id., Opinion of A.G. Fennelly para. 2.
252. Id.
253. Id. para. 9.
254. Id. para. 15.
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The first part of the Court’s opinion established the horizontal
255
direct effect of Article 39 and Regulation 1612/68. Next, the Court
proceeded to address the merits of the requirement that applicants
possess the patentino.256 The Court reasoned that since the patentino
was issued only in Bolzano, and the majority of Bolzano residents are
257
Italian, nationals of other Member States were at a disadvantage.
The requirement could, as in Bickel/Franz, be justified on the basis of
258
proportionality. However, by barring candidates from proving their
ability by any other means, the bank’s action was disproportionate
and amounted to indirect discrimination in violation of Community
259
law.
Angonese is further testament to the Court’s willingness to find a
link to Community law in an increasing variety of legal situations—in
this case, a private employment relationship. Again, the Court
announces that the language requirement is a legitimate state interest,
260
Relying on a dictum from
but then summarily strikes it down.
Groener, the Court ruled that “the principle of non-discrimination
precludes any requirement that the linguistic knowledge in question
must have been acquired within the national territory.”261 In
Angonese, the Court treats the patentino requirement as though its
sole aim was to ascertain individual applicants’ knowledge of German
and Italian. Again, the Court’s approach is one of institutional
blindness, as if to say “we rule on individual Community rights, and
have no competence to consider the purposes of domestic language
policy.”
The Court sees the aim of the requirement in different terms
than the employer and the Bolzano community. The focus is on the
Community rights of individuals that speak the minority language,

255. Id. paras. 15-36. This portion of the ruling garnished much more attention from
Community legal scholars than the subsequent ruling on the merits of the requirement.
Asserting the horizontal direct effect of a fundamental freedom such as the freedom of
movement for workers contained in Article 39 is indeed a momentous development in
Community law, and will undoubtedly undercut efforts to protect minority languages by
prohibiting even private parties from making certain distinctions in favor of the minority
languages.
256. Id. para. 37.
257. Id. para. 40.
258. Id. para. 42. Again, the Court pronounced the legitimacy of the aim (in this case,
ascertaining linguistic competence), and then summarily rejected it. See id. para. 44.
259. Id. paras. 44-46.
260. Id.
261. Id. para. 43.
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and not the flourishing of the minority language group itself.262 It is
almost certain that the bank had adopted a policy requiring the
patentino in part because it could thus encourage employment among
local Bolzano residents, and perhaps foster banking relationships with
the local bilingual population.
In this respect the patentino
requirement was analogous to the Irish requirement at issue in
Groener: it served an immediate functional purpose, but also had a
collateral effect of contributing to the flourishing of the minority
group. In the same respect Angonese is different than Bickel/Franz.
The language right provided to criminal defendants did not
reverberate collaterally to the benefit of the German-speaking
community. However, Angonese is evidence of the dangers of
extending the Bickel/Franz interpretation of the non-discrimination
principle to an increasing array of bona fide group rights aimed at
contributing to the cultural life of minority language groups.
It may be said that in applying Community law to situations as in
Angonese, the ECJ is taking “free movement” and “nondiscrimination” to their logical conclusions. Nevertheless, such a rigid
formalist approach is rarely required of judicial institutions, and one
must wonder how prudent such an approach is in the context of
language.263 Language is always a politically sensitive issue because it
is so intimately connected with the preservation of regional and
cultural identity. To the extent the ECJ’s current approach ignores
the sui generis nature of group rights, it glosses over this cultural and
political sensitivity. The broad interpretation of European citizenship
flowing from Martinez Sala, Trojani, and Directive 2004/38 means
that EU citizens will be able to claim community rights in an
increasing range of scenarios. As the scope of Community law
widens, the space for group rights to operate shrinks correspondingly.
Such a dynamic is, to put it lightly, inadequate for the protection of
minority language groups.

262. See id. para. 40 (“Since the majority of residents of the province of Bolzano are Italian
nationals, the obligation to obtain the requisite Certificate puts nationals of other Member
States at a disadvantage by comparison with residents of the province.”).
263. See Lane & Shuibhne, supra note 249, at 1246 (“Language is a politically sensitive issue
in any context, but perhaps even more so where it is so intimately connected with the
preservation and evolution of regional culture.”).
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D. Beyond Article 12: Moving Toward a New Vocabulary of Sui
Generis Group Rights
The inadequacy results from the failure of the EC institutions
law to conceive of minority language groups as proper subjects of
Community law. The proportionality test will almost always result in
the striking down of Member State’s group protections because the
Member States’ interests are defined narrowly. Member States have
thus signed away most of their sovereign rights to provide any group
protection that conflicts—even indirectly—with Community Law.
Member States have a reduced incentive to address minority concerns
at the group level, since such measures are bound to conflict with the
freedom of movement of persons and workers, as well as the principle
of non-discrimination. The irony is that just as the EC is abandoning
its exclusive economic field of operation, and developing into a social
and political union, equal footing for minority languages may very
well be in jeopardy.
I believe an alternate approach is available in this context. When
Member States grant special group rights to minority language
groups, they are not violating the non-discrimination principle;
instead, they are implicitly recognizing the inadequacy of the
absolutist interpretation of such a principle. Minority groups merit
exceptional treatment because their situation is exceptional (or sui
264
Insofar as
generis, to again borrow Segesvary’s formulation).
Community law fails to recognize this, the minority language groups
are the first casualty. Stated differently, the current state of
Community law lacks a sufficient vocabulary to treat minority
language groups as legally protectable subjects.
265
A comparison to U.S. law may be of value at this juncture.
Compare the race segregation of schoolchildren in Brown v. Board of
266
Education to the discrimination at issue in, for example, Angonese.
In some respects, the distinctions drawn are similar: individuals
pertaining to certain groups are afforded different treatment based on
the mere fact of their belonging to a group. Only at the most abstract
level, however, does the analogy hold. A closer examination of the
distinction reveals an important difference. In the case of Brown, the
distinction drawn between black and white schoolchildren bore no

264. See Segesvary, supra note 132, at 102.
265. Cf. MASSANA, supra note 25, at 136-37 (contrasting Brown and racial segregation in the
United States with the separation of schoolchildren in Bolzano).
266. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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relation to the aim sought. During the Jim Crow era, the American
political establishment may have considered it morally legitimate for
Southern states to maintain that separate schooling was necessary for
the development of the schoolchildren.267 At that time, then, it may
be said that race was therefore inextricably intertwined with the
education system, and consequently that segregation fostered the
legitimate policy of education. But by the 1950s the distinction had
become sheer arbitrariness. It no longer was morally or empirically
possible to maintain that segregating the races aided in the education
of children. Stripped of the logical connection to the education
system, the distinction was nothing more than a pretextual method of
enforcing an extant social order. But preserving Southern whites’
privileges was not a valid state interest that could justify the
distinction.268
267. Of course, this justification was largely pretextual even in the late nineteenth century.
The cardinal purpose of segregation was the entrenchment of race hierarchies. See U.S.
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (describing affirmative action as “designed to
break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1987) (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208); Sanford Levison et al., What
Are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 255, 275-76 (2003) (criticizing
Justice Warren’s Brown opinion for its failure to take into account “the history of racial
segregation in the South and the deep commitment of many of its white citizens to preserving an
existing racial hierarchy”); Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of
Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1767 (2001) (lauding Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion
in Plessy v. Ferguson for its insight that “state sponsored segregation violated the Equal
Protection Claude because . . . the law should not ignore that race-based exclusion was
intentionally and inherently subordinating”). There also existed a scientific literature of
American polygenesis that argued that the races were separate species. See John Hanson &
David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 314 n.660 (2003) (providing a
description of the theory of polygenesis, which held that whites and blacks were separate
species); Brian Willis, Black Bodies, White Science: The Slave Daguerreotypes of Louis Agassiz,
12 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 102, 102-03 (1996) (noting that “the American theory of
polygenesis” popularized by Drs. Louis Agassiz and Samuel Morton purported to prove that
different “races” were created separately). The fact that polygenesis was popularized in the
mid-nineteenth century is no coincidence: as the country spiraled into civil war, it justified
slavery based on science and religion. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN
101-05 (1996). Moreover, the polygenists used evolution to affirm “that races had been separate
long enough to evolve major inherited differences in talent and intelligence.” Id. at 105.
268. This discussion of Brown is not intended as a summation of the doctrinal niceties of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence as reflected in that case. Instead,
it aims merely to articulate a comparison of the challenged discriminatory measures in both
Brown and Angonese in order to draw an important distinction in the relative state interests at
stake. In the case of school segregation at issue in Brown, the American legal and political
establishment eventually exposed segregation as a morally and legally impermissible
entrenchment of white privilege. In the case of the minority protection at issue in Angonese, the
European legal and political establishment has, on the contrary, affirmed repeatedly the
legitimacy of the state interest.
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However, in the case of Angonese, the distinction drawn
(impliedly, between Bolzano-resident German speakers and other
German speakers) bore an identifiable relation to the aim of
contributing to the flourishing of the local community. The policy in
Angonese, then, was not a pretextual and protectionist attempt to
favor entrenched economic interests. It was not, in short, the sort of
distinction that the EC has fought against so successfully over the
years. Unlike the segregationist motive in Brown, the state interest in
preserving national culture and languages is not immoral or
undesirable; indeed, it is subject to continual affirmations to the
contrary, at both the Community level (indeed, by the ECJ itself) and
the Member State level.
Admittedly, the distinction will not always be so clear as it is
between Brown and Angonese, but the ECJ has the institutional
expertise and experience of drawing such distinctions. Throughout its
history, the ECJ has exhibited boldness and shrewdness in smoking
out illegitimate protectionist motives disguised as legitimate exercises
269
of Member State power. The fundamental problem is that the ECJ
cannot gauge the tightness of the connection between a distinction
and an aim if it does not recognize the aim for what it truly is. Instead
of framing the interest as an accommodation for minority language
speakers, the ECJ should consider the well-being of the community of
speakers as a sui generis and irreducible subject of European law.
The ease with which the ECJ formally endorses the legitimacy of
protecting minority languages renders this inadequacy all the more
complicated. Policymakers and litigants do not need to convince the
ECJ of the importance of linguistic diversity; from Groener to
Angonese, the ECJ has expressly recognized the importance of the
270
interest. Instead, it needs to develop a new vocabulary altogether.
269. See, e.g., Case 407/85, 3 Glocken GmbH v. USL Centro-Sud, 1988 E.C.R. 4233 (holding
that Italian rules on pasta composition cannot be used to block pasta imports from other
Member States); Case 178/84, Comm’n v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227 (holding that German
beer purity laws cannot be used to stop importation of beer lawfully produced in other Member
States); Case 112/84, Humboldt v. Directeur des Service Fiscaux, 1985 E.C.R. 1367 (holding that
French tax regime was discriminatory when it contained dramatically higher rates for cars that
no French carmaker produced); Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
Fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649 (holding that German alcohol composition
laws cannot be used to block importation of lawfully produced spirits).
270. See Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ.
Comm., 1989 E.C.R. 3967 para. 19 (“The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy
for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is both the national
language and the first official language.”). See also Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di
Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139 para. 44 (“[R]equiring an applicant for a post to
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To start with, the ECJ should recognize that laws protecting a group
of minority language speakers are not meant purely to maintain the
number of individuals who are familiar with, or speak, that language.
If that were true, then it would be enough to assert, as the ECJ has
often done, that language proficiency requirements are a legitimate
objective to pursue. Oftentimes, such laws and measures are
intended to vest rights only in members of that community to the
271
exclusion of non-members.
Of course, not all minority-protective domestic laws are equally
at risk of being struck down under the current framework. For
example, the quasi-federal system of the Spanish autonomous
272
communities in itself stands little chance of violating the EC Treaty.
Similarly, the simple constitutional or codified recognition of multiple
official languages will certainly not raise eyebrows in Brussels.273
These protections (especially the latter) are, however, largely
symbolic. While the symbolic order of a language group is
constitutive of that group, and reinforces its sense of identity, a
language’s long-term survival depends on its ability to remain
relevant in the lives of its speakers not merely symbolically. In this
context, it is not so much the creation of the Catalonian Generalitat274
that matters as how the Generalitat contributes to the flourishing of
the Catalonian community—and, by extension, its language.
However, laws that condition grant substantive rights to individuals
by virtue of their membership in a linguistic community are most at
risk, and are almost certain to provoke litigation in the European
courts.275 As such, even if the procedural protections discussed supra
do not, in themselves, appear to be on a collision course with the EC
Treaty, their effectiveness may be undermined by tying the hands of
the local lawmakers who are unable to provide substantive and
affirmative protections for local languages.
This Article has been primarily concerned with laws impeding
the free movement of workers and EU citizens, and it is true that any

have a certain level of linguistic knowledge may be legitimate and possession of a diploma such
as the Certificate may constitute a criterion for assessing that knowledge . . . .”).
271. Consider, for example, the requirement that a certain percentage of radio and
television programming be conducted in Catalán. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
272. See supra Part I.C.
273. See supra Part I.C.
274. See supra note 46.
275. Whether such substantive rights are dispensed from the central government or substate legislative entities is of no moment.
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domestic laws that place non-members at a disadvantage vis-à-vis
linguistic community members are at most risk. However, it is not
difficult to conceive of minority-protective laws that counteract the
free movement of services or capital either. To take a current
example, the newly amended Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia
creates a right for individual Catalonians to be served in Catalán.276 If
a French national perceives a good business opportunity in Catalonia,
but speaks no Catalán and anticipates serving a primarily Spanish
client base, can that French businessman obtain redress in the ECJ if
a barrage of complaints file in from potential Catalán consumers
complaining of his lack of respect for their language rights? Or what
result where an Austrian broadcasting company looking to purchase a
local radio station in Trentino-Alto Adige to expand its Italian
coverage decides the transaction is no longer favorable if it must also
broadcast in German on account of regional or even central
government regulations mandating a certain percentage of German
broadcasting? Rather than declaring a moratorium on such laws, it
makes more sense to charge the ECJ with an honest inquiry into the
motives of the Member State (or regional) legislatures promulgating
the laws.
CONCLUSION
Member States may expect more group protective measures to
be invalidated by the ECJ if there is any link, even a tenuous link, to
the EC Treaty. What would follow could be a race to the bottom,
with the least protective Member States being vindicated because
their protections extended to minority groups are so paltry as to not
conflict with the Treaty.
There is considerable potential for development in the
interaction of Community law and Member State law with respect to
minority language rights.
After Bickel/Franz, Angonese, and
Martinez Sala, the time is ripe for addressing these problems. What is
necessary is a recognition of minority language groups as subjects of
sui generis group rights, as discussed supra in Part II.A. Assuming the
ECJ does not alter its course sua sponte, at least three strategies are
possible. First, the Member States could explicitly grant competence
to the EC to address minority language concerns. In this context,
Article 151 represents a tentative, though incomplete, step in the right
direction. A truly effective competence must include an explicit
276. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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mention of minority rights, and provide a means of implementation
that does not require unanimity. The chief difficulty with such an
approach is that it displaces the political discussions about minority
rights away from the Member States to Brussels without tempering
277
the general applicability of Article 12’s non-discrimination norm.
As we have seen, the Member States and their sub-state units have
demonstrated more enthusiasm and experience in addressing the
minority language concerns.
Second, Member States could temper the rigor with which the
ECJ interprets the consequences of the individual rights flowing from
the four freedoms and beyond. This solution too would require
Treaty modification. Perhaps a compromise similar to Article 5’s
278
subsidiarity principle could be possible; the ECJ would simply look
the other way when some Member State measures conflict with a
Community law provision such as the non-discrimination norm.
Articles I-2 and I-3(3) of the Constitution are promising proposals in
this regard, but the experience from Article 151 should caution
against an exaggerated optimism. More explicit language is likely
needed in order for the ECJ to approve of group-based preferences
that conflict with core Community principles enshrined in the
Treaties.
Third, Member States could include a directly effective
affirmative action treaty provision permitting action by Member
States to ensure substantive equality for minority groups, linguistic or
otherwise.279 Substantive equality, in this instance, would apply on a
group basis, with minorities having equal opportunities to witness the
flourishing of their languages.
Whatever the action is, the EC should act soon. The funded
projects to help preserve minority languages, the soft law
pronouncements, and the changing mood about European integration
all testify to the anxiety in the EC that somehow, something must be

277. For a discussion of the difficulties inhering in selecting a Community-level language
policy, see Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Does the Draft Constitution Contain a Language Policy?,
MERCATOR INT’L SYMPOSIUM: EUR. 2004: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ALL LANGUAGES? 6
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/pdf/simp-shuibhne.pdf (last visited
June 18, 2007).
278. See EC Treaty art. 5.
279. See EC Treaty art. 141. Article 141(4) provides, “With a view to ensuring full equality
in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not
prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific
advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational
activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.” Id. art. 141(4).
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done to address this tension between individual rights and minority
group rights. Given the current stalled state of the integration
discourse in light of the 2005 vetoes, it may be a particularly
propitious moment to move ahead. Of course, the lack of adequate
protection for minority language rights itself did not hold up the
ratification of the EU Constitution; however, a decisive step to
address this and similar problems could provide some momentum in
the effort to mute the anti-integrationist discourse of Europe as the
grand destroyer of cultural particularities.

